Alienation in Capitalist Society by Francis, Cyril
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alienation in Capitalist Society 
Prepared by: Cyril Francis 
Supervisor: Dr. Stefan Kipfer 
 
 
 
 
June 24, 2016 
 
 
 
A Major Paper submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master (or Magisteriate, if relevant) in Environmental Studies, York 
University Ontario, Canada  
 
 
 
Cyril Francis         Stefan Kipfer 
MA Candidate        Supervising Professor  
2 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to study the roots of the alienation that currently exists in society. Alienation for 
this paper refers to the rift that exists between humans as we currently are and the potential that we 
can reach. This paper will attempt to trace the roots of alienation to the origins of the capitalist mode of 
production. In this, it will first deal with the “transition debate” and posit an understanding of the 
transition as something that brought about a drastic and qualitative change in social relations and the 
ways in which people reproduce themselves. It will attempt to denaturalize capitalist relations in order 
to truly trace the origins of the logic of capital. The paper will then delve into human nature. It will put 
forth a notion of human nature that is social and productive in order to understand some of the ways 
that capitalist production relations have fettered the growth of human nature. Finally, the paper will 
deal with alienation. It will trace the roots of alienation in some of the foundational tenets of the 
capitalist mode of production and discuss ways in which this alienation manifests itself. This paper ends 
with noting that alienation is inherent within capitalism and that in order for humans to achieve the 
same potential that capitalist production also generates, capitalism itself will have to be replaced with 
an alternate mode of production.  
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Foreword 
My Area of Concentration that appears in my Plan of Study is the Alienation of humans to nature. The 
goal that I intend to achieve in my masters is to study the rift that currently exists between humans and 
nature. I intend to study that gap not in an external way such that more exposure to nature would solve 
the problem, but to dig deeper and study the causes of that alienation and understand some of the 
forces that exist to create and perpetuate the current relationship. Towards this broader purpose, my 
Major Research Paper will shed light on some of the ways in which the current economic system creates 
alienation. This paper will trace the roots of alienation to the origins of capitalism to attempt to 
understand whether the alienation that currently exists can be overcome under capitalist production, or 
whether alienation is an inherent element that comes with the capitalist mode of production.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Human beings are creatures with a great deal of potential. Arising mostly from our consciousness that 
distinguishes us from other animals, we have the ability to think and plan beyond basic survival instincts 
and immediate gratification. While this has the potential to be a wonderful thing that should be 
cherished and encouraged to grow, this paper will argue that the current system (capitalism) that we are 
forced to live under acts to limit the amount of growth that is possible and even fetter the current state 
of human beings. This paper will not only show that the current form of capitalism is guilty of this, but 
will attempt to trace the root cause of why this happens. Marx uses the term alienation to describe this 
impact of the capitalist mode of production on humans. This paper will explore the origins of alienation 
and attempt to trace it back to the origins of capitalism. It will begin by studying the birth of capitalism 
to show the inception of some of the logics of capital. It will then delve into human nature in order to 
show how capitalism is guilty of suppressing it and preventing its development. Finally the paper will go 
into Marx’s theory of alienation and pinpoint the specific relations that have been inhibited by the 
capitalist mode of production and describe how this has fettered the growth of human nature. 
This paper will begin by studying the birth of capitalism. In this, the paper will try to trace the roots of 
the capitalist mode of production and show how capitalist relations are distinct from other modes of 
production. It will be careful to ensure that capitalist social relations are denaturalized and therefore 
traces of it are not seen in previous or other modes of production. This paper will show that capitalist 
relations have a logic that is radically different from other modes of production and therefore, in order 
for capitalism to begin, it would require a qualitative shift in social relations. This transition could not 
happen because of a simple increase and expansion of trade and commerce that was already taking 
place, but it would require a radical shift in social relations and the use of coercion to compel people to 
work.  In order to trace and understand the origins of alienation, it is essential to trace and understand 
the roots of the foundational characteristics of capitalism. 
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The next section will focus on human nature. Alienation essentially states that humans are not allowed 
to reach their full potential and therefore any study of alienation must delve into what this potential 
actually is. This section will attempt to understand human nature from a holistic perspective and will 
outline some of the major thinkers who have contributed to this topic. There will be a focus on the 
productive and social aspects of human nature because of their dominance in shaping us. This paper will 
be critical of simplistic views of human nature that aim to simplify the complexity that exists within us to 
explain certain phenomenon. 
Finally, this paper will delve into the theory of alienation. It will try to show how, from its inception, 
capitalism is a system that alienates the people who live under it. While the paper will acknowledge that 
capitalism has brought about some positive aspects, it will show how it has come up against obstacles 
that it cannot overcome in terms of human development. This paper will show that the increased wealth 
and technology that have come about due to capitalism has allowed for human nature to grow and 
progress in ways that was not possible in other systems, but that the economic focus of capitalism does 
not allow for this new found potential to be fully realized. This paper will show how, from its inception, 
capitalism created the conditions for a growth in human nature that it is unable to fulfil.  
In endeavouring to show this link, this paper will touch upon a wide range of topics and themes. In the 
first part of the paper, in dealing with the transition to capitalism, the paper will not attempt to 
formulate a theory of the origins of capitalism, but will instead briefly introduce some of the most 
prevalent theorists on this topic and present some of their major findings. Although it draws above all 
on the contributions of Political Marxism, it will not be a detailed outline of any school of thought, but a 
presentation of the main themes and ideas that are present in this debate. In the second section on 
human nature, the paper will also take a similar approach. It will present a brief outline of some of the 
major thinkers in this field and attempt to reach an understanding that is holistic while taking into 
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consideration the complicated nature of human beings. The last section will borrow from a range of 
authors on alienation and show how capitalism has stifled human growth.  
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2.0 Historicizing Capitalism 
2.1 Origins of Capitalism 
In this section of the paper, the origins of the capitalist mode of production and the creation of the 
social relations necessary to accompany the transition from feudal social and property relations to 
capitalist ones will be analyzed. Various authors and schools of thought have contested this topic, but it 
is Marxist scholars who have contributed the most to the discussion and they have been the most active 
in the analysis and understanding of the transition to capitalism. Because of this, while there will be a 
brief introduction into some of the other schools of thought and the ways in which they have broached 
this topic, the focus will remain on the Marxist scholars and their interpretation. The Marxists, not 
surprisingly, are also divided amongst themselves into a few camps and there has been a very 
contentious debate around where, when, and how the birth of capitalism took place. An accurate 
account of the transition to capitalism is important for understanding the root cause of how capitalism 
came to be such a dominant system, and whose relations now appear to reach every corner of the globe 
almost without exception. In these accounts, the school of thought known as Political Marxism is one 
that I found to be the most convincing for many reasons, the most significant of which was its ability to 
denaturalize capitalism. This paper will not attempt to develop an account of the transition, but will 
instead draw on the work of others in order to present the key features of capitalism that lead to 
alienation and attempt to trace the roots of those features to the origins of the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Denaturalizing capitalist relations is crucial because of the particularly distinct nature of capital and the 
way in which it works. There is no doubt that over the last four centuries the world has changed in a way 
that is unprecedented in human history. From transportation and communication technology to 
anthropogenic climate change, the world that we currently live in and the trajectory that has been 
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present over the last four centuries has been acutely distinct from any other period in human history. 
This uniqueness begs the question of how this exceptional situation came to be. I believe that the main 
driver of many of the drastic changes and the rapid pace at which they happen is the capitalist mode of 
production. Therefore, to understand how we came to this juncture in history, I believe it is fundamental 
to first understand how capitalism came about and the logics that are inherent with it. I think that the 
distinctiveness of Capital’s drive is the primary reason for this hegemonic influence that capitalism 
appears to have on present day society. I also believe that Capital has a specific driving force that is 
unique and therefore warrants an explanation beyond simply that capitalism’s “development is the 
natural outcome of human practices almost as old as the species itself, which required only the removal 
of external obstacles that hindered its realization”. This is the definition of the “commercialization 
model” in the transition debate that will be expanded on in later sections (Wood, 2002, p. 11). 
In order to understand capitalism as a system that is unique from others it is important to rigidly define 
what is meant by capitalism. In this respect, I believe Wolf does a comprehensive job when he specifies 
what capitalist relations entail in the following passage:  
The capitalist mode of production shows three intertwined characteristics. First, capitalists 
detain control of the means of production. Second, labourers are denied independent access to 
means of production and must sell their labour power to the capitalists. Third, the maximization 
of surplus produced by the labourers with the means of production owned by the capitalists 
entails ‘ceaseless accumulation accompanied by changes in the means of production’ (1985, p. 
82) 
He also notes the fundamental difference between wealth and capital which many of the other accounts 
of the transition do not consider. He notes that “wealth in the hands of holders of wealth is not capital 
until it controls means of production, buys labour power, and puts it to work, continuously expanding 
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surpluses by intensifying productivity through an ever-rising curve of technological inputs”(78). This 
formulation therefore creates a sharp contrast between capital and wealth and sees them as unique 
entities with logics that are inherently different. Wolf therefore contends that there is no such thing as 
mercantile or merchant capital and that in order for capitalism to be labelled as capitalism, it must be 
capitalism-in-production. Some examples of authors who conflate these will be provided in later 
sections, but it is important to note that these schools of thought do not allow for Capital and the social 
relations that are necessary to sustain it to be seen as a unique logic. They instead tend see them as an 
expansion of commerce and trading that was taking place before the advent of capitalism. The way 
these schools of thought naturalize capitalism will be addressed in coming sections in greater detail. 
Another distinction that is very useful in its method of denaturalizing capital is the work of Karl Polanyi, 
especially seen in The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 2001), and his work on markets and the role they 
play in society. Polanyi’s conception of the market and the change in its role within our daily lives is 
especially telling for an understanding of the transition to capitalism. Polanyi notes that throughout 
history, wherever markets have existed, they have existed in tandem with society; with society playing a 
very active role in shaping and controlling the role that the market plays. Polanyi uses the term 
“embedded” to describe the relationship between the market and society before the advent of 
capitalism. He notes that one of the fundamental distinctions that separate capitalism from alternative 
modes of organizing society is the “embeddedness” of the market. He contends that it is only within a 
capitalist mode of production that the market is no longer embedded into society. Here he believes that 
a stark change took place with the advent of capitalism. He notes that in historic societies, there often 
existed a market, but this market was subordinate to society. It is only within a capitalist economic 
system that society is “controlled by markets” (43-58). He notes that “[n]o society could, naturally, live 
for any length of time unless it possessed an economy of some sort; but previously to our time no 
economy has ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by markets. . . . Gain and profit made 
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on exchange never before played an important part in human economy” (43). While it is important to 
note that this argument can be used to underline the importance of regulating capitalism, the general 
point about the market playing a unique role in the market still stands. Wood (2002) agrees with this 
notion and notes that this conception sees markets as a compulsion in capitalist society whereas it was 
an opportunity in previous methods of organizations. She believes that it is only when markets become 
a central organizing force around which society reproduces itself that capitalism has truly manifested 
itself. With these ideas as a foundation, the paper will now outline some of the most prevalent accounts 
of the transition and dissect them based on their ability to denaturalize capitalist relations and explain 
the process which allowed for capitalism to emerge. 
2.1.1 The Transition Debate  
In light of these authors and the drive to denaturalize capitalist relations, this section will outline a very 
brief history of the debate and the main players who have been active in it. Temporally, these studies 
range from explanations that date the origins of capitalism from over 5000 years ago (Frank & Gills, 
1996) to ones that believe it to have come about around 200 years ago (Wolf, 1985). Spatially, the 
debate ranges from arguments that the transition occurred in the rural countryside in England (Wood, 
2002) to some that believe that it was a global phenomenon whose origins cannot be traced to a single 
region, country, or even continent (Wallerstein, 2004). The debates also range in scope about the 
reasons that capitalism came about. From ones that argue that there was a crisis of feudalism that 
allowed capital to break the fetters and emerge as the dominant mode of organizing society (Marx, 
1977) to those that believe that humanity has always had a penchant to move towards capitalism and 
that this is the epitome of human development, thus signifying an “end to history” (Fukuyama, 2006). 
The studies also range in scope as to the length of the transition. From some studies believing that 
capitalism emerged as the victorious economic model through a revolution (i.e. quickly) to others that 
believe that this process has taken thousands of years that has finally culminated in the form of 
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advanced capitalism that we live in today. This paper will begin with a summary of the ideas of the main 
contributors to this debate and their positions will be outlined so the reader can get a holistic grasp on 
the conversation that has been taking place over the history of this debate. The most prevalent way of 
explaining the transition to capitalism is known as the “commercialization model” of economic 
development.  
 Commercialization Model 
The most common approach that is taken in explaining the transition to capitalism is the 
Commercialization Model. The basic premise of this model is that the development of capitalism is “the 
natural outcome of human practices almost as old as the species itself, which required only the removal 
of external obstacles that hindered its realization” (Wood, 2002, p. 11). The argument associated with 
this school as thought goes as follows: with or without a natural tendency to “truck, barter, and 
exchange” humans have been engaging in acts of exchange since the dawn of history. This process has 
evolved over time due to both technological improvements and the division of labour. In many accounts 
these two processes are intrinsically linked and therefore some of them have tendencies of 
technological determinism. These accounts, whether explicitly or not, tend to have capitalism as the 
highest stage of progress in human history. These accounts don’t see a quantitative break with the 
introduction and spread of capitalist social relations, but instead see an expansion in markets and a 
growing commercialization of economic life as leading to the onset of capitalism.  
 A key point in these accounts is the role that the market plays. These accounts tend to see the market 
as an opportunity for people to use to their own advantage or profit rather than the market playing a 
coercive role in human society which compels people to act under its logic. Wood (2002) notes that in 
these accounts “the logic of the market remained ever the same: always an opportunity to be taken 
whenever possible, always conducive to economic growth and the improvement of productive forces, 
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always bound eventually to produce industrial capitalism, if left free to work out its natural logic” (15). 
This account of the market will be disputed in later sections of the paper in greater detail, but it is 
important to note that the market in these accounts, both before and after the onset of capitalism, 
played a similar role in society. Another troubling trend in these accounts is that they tend to see 
“traces” of capitalist development in many different modes of organization. They tend to identify 
capitalist relations in the merchant activity of “buying cheap and selling dear”. This is closely tied to the 
conflation that happens between wealth and capital that was mentioned earlier. The failure to see the 
difference in these two very distinct terms leads to a theory that sees capitalist relations in many forms 
of trade and does not give credence to the fact that, as Marx put it, “Capital is a social relation” (Marx, 
1977, p. 932) Finally, these accounts tend to often conflate the terms bourgeois and capitalist. In its 
original context, a burgher was simply a person of non-noble status who worked for their wage, but did 
not do manual labour or, to put it another way, someone who typically did more mental than physical 
labour. This conflation leads to proponents of this account of the transition to trace a linear path 
between the burgher and the capitalist. Wood (2002)notes that “in the slippage from town-dweller to 
capitalist via the merchant that occurs in the later uses of ‘bourgeois’, we can follow the logic of the 
commercialization model: the ancient town-dweller gives way to the medieval burgher, who in turn 
develops seamlessly into the modern capitalist” (14).  
It must be noted that not all accounts that fall within the commercialization model succumb to the trend 
to see the transition to capitalism as a seamless process. But even in variants that see capitalism as a 
rupture of social networks and traditions, there is a tendency to focus on changes that have taken place 
in the forces and institutions that have “fettered” the natural evolution of trade as opposed to social 
relations or the role of markets in society. The biggest fault of the commercialization model is that it did 
not make a distinction between capitalist social relations and the rest of history (Wood, 2002). Its 
emphasis on the qualitative increases that came about within the transition leads it to an explanation 
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that, in fact, assumes as a given the very thing that needs explaining. It assumes that capitalism has 
existed in an embryonic phase throughout history and that when the barriers to pursuing the profit 
motive and improving labour productivity were removed, capitalism was allowed to finally break 
through. An example of this is in Heller's (2011) new book, The Birth of Capitalism. This avoids many of 
the pitfalls of some of the other accounts of the commercialization model and is explicitly about tracing 
a holistic account of the transition. But even here there is an underlying tendency to naturalize capitalist 
relations in previous modes of organization and trace the origin of capitalism to the removal of obstacles 
that previously inhibited it from sprouting. He notes early in the book that “Capitalism undoubtedly 
broke through in Europe. But we assert the existence of a non-European proto-capitalism” (3, emphasis 
added). This statement lays the foundation for a theory of the origin of capitalism as something that was 
present in the interstices of previous modes of organization across the globe and that once the fetters 
were removed, it was allowed to “break through” and establish itself. Although he acknowledges that it 
did in fact originate in Europe, and more specifically in England, the notion that there existed “proto-
capitalism” in other countries shows the naturalization of capitalist relations that many other authors 
are also guilty of. 
Within the commercialization model there are also certain deviations that this model can take in its 
approach and focus. One of these is the demographic model. This account attributes European 
development to autonomous cycles of population growth and decline. Supply and demand, in these 
accounts, is the underlying cause of the transition to capitalism (i.e. as population grew, demand also 
grew, making the feudal system obsolete). This account still attributes the emergence of capitalism as an 
outcome of the natural laws of market and therefore the “invisible hand” of the market is taken as a 
given. The world systems approach is also one that has gained a lot of traction among Marxists and the 
left in general. In this account, the development of capitalism is contingent on unequal exchange 
between a “core” and “periphery”. This theory posits that the development of capitalism took place in 
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Europe because of the colonial trade relations that existed due to colonialism and imperialism. Europe 
(the “core”) exploited its colonies (the “periphery”) which allowed them to accumulate at an 
unprecedented rate. The colonies, while some of them more “advanced” than Europe before the 
transition, were unable to accumulate because of the uneven trade relations that were created and 
therefore were stuck in the mode of production that they had prior to the advent of capitalism (Brenner, 
1977). A central tenet of this explanation is the role that the state played in European society. Europe 
had a fragmented state form and the role of the nation state encouraged competition and therefore 
stimulated nations to seek alternative ways to increase productivity. This competitive drive led to the 
capitalist breakthrough in Europe whereas states that were not in Europe were still fettered by age old 
traditions and customs or did not have the necessary drive to increase productivity. This method of 
explanation again falls into the commercialization model because its foundations are based in two of the 
fundamental characteristics of this account: i) capitalism is directly related to a quantitative increase in 
trade, and ii) when the fetters to capitalist development were removed, the capitalist mode of 
production emerged to fill the void that previous modes of production could not (Wood, 2002).  
While all of these accounts are much more complicated than the brief summary provided here, the 
underlying themes and tendencies are outlined and telling as to the motivations and impetuses behind 
the transition to capitalism. Most of these accounts tend to see as a given the very thing that 
distinguishes capitalism from other modes of production and therefore do not see the drastic change in 
social relations that had to have taken place in order to bring about a capitalist mode of production. 
Wood (2002) notes that “the transition to capitalism in all these explanations is a quantitative expansion 
of commercial activity and the universal and transhistorical laws of the market” (20). This method of 
explanation, while it may shed light on some of the tendencies of capitalism, does not explain their 
origin. A simple expansion of commercial activity, I believe, is insufficient in explaining the drastic social, 
political, and economic consequences that the capitalist mode of production has had on society as a 
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whole. In order to truly understand how this system came about and how it has had the far reaching 
changes in social organization as it has had, we need to understand the inception of capitalism as a 
drastic rupture to social relations. This does not necessitate that this changed happen quickly, but there 
must be an understanding of the destruction of the old form of social relations and the creation of new 
ones in order to explain the unique system that is capitalism.  
Marxist considerations 
This paper has included a very brief introduction to some of the non-Marxist renditions of the transition, 
but will focus more on Marxist considerations because they tend to attempt to trace internal relations 
better and therefore address the root cause of the issue. Therefore, some of the main players in this 
debate and the views that they hold will be outlined in this section. As Heller (2011) notes, the Marxist 
method brings about a dialectical consideration of the events that transpired to bring about the 
capitalist mode of production, but, as will be shown in the coming sections, even this sometimes falls 
short and become prey to the temptation of the commercialization model (9). A key distinction that will 
separate many of the Marxist methods from each other is the role that the capitalist market has on 
society. The market here refers to gain and profit that is made through exchange and therefore is not a 
physical entity, but more a social relation and a mode of reproducing oneself and society as a whole 
(Polanyi, 2001). Wood (2002), I believe, has the most comprehensive conception of the market in its 
ability to bring out the unique characteristics that the market plays in capitalist society. Her distinction 
between the market as an opportunity (what existed in other societies) and the market as an imperative 
(what is unique to capitalism) allows us to view the market as something that is fundamentally different 
from the way that it functioned in any other mode of production. This allows us to uniquely categorize 
capitalism as a mode of production that is radically different from any other mode of production. This 
then allows us to treat capitalism as a systematically different system that emerged not just through an 
expansion of trade or an increased level of technological development, but as one that radically alters 
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social relationships and operates on a unique logic that is unprecedented in human societies. She notes 
that “a conception of the capitalist market that fully acknowledges its imperatives and compulsions, 
while recognizing that these imperatives are rooted not in some transhistorical natural law but in 
historically specific social relations, constituted by human agency and subject to change” is crucial in 
differentiating capitalism from previous modes of production (34). To attain this conception of the 
market and the impacts that this has on the origins of the capitalist mode of production, let us first turn 
to Marx himself to consider his points on this issue. 
Marx on the Transition 
A big part of the reason why there is so much debate on the transition question among Marxists is 
because in Marx’s own writings there appear to be two accounts about how the transition came about.  
Wood (2002), again, does a comprehensive job of outlining these two accounts. She notes that the first 
approach came about in his earlier writings (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx, 
2012), and parts of The German Ideology (Marx & Engels, 1970)). Here he writes that capitalism arose as 
a result of a transhistorical process of technological progress where the burgher class played a leading 
role. In this view Marx sees capitalist relations in the ‘interstices’ of the feudal mode of production and it 
enters the mainstream when it ‘bursts asunder’ the fetters of the feudal system. The passages in this 
view can be seen to be a variant of the commercialization model where there was the embryo of 
capitalist relations within the feudal system and that capitalist tendencies existed before the rise of 
capitalist production. These tendencies were lurking under the surface waiting for the fetters that were 
restraining them to be removed to break through and bring about capitalist relations. This conception of 
the transition, like many of his other thoughts, changed as Marx developed himself politically. 
The second approach that Marx takes can be gleaned from some of his later writings (Capital (Marx, 
1977) and The Grundrisse (Marx, 1993)) where he critiques the notion of “the so-called primitive 
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accumulation”. Primitive accumulation is essentially the accumulation that took place before 
‘commercial society’ was established. Marx critiqued this notion because of the trend to read into this as 
the only necessary precondition to the onset of capitalism.  The explanation of the origin of capitalism 
using the notion of “primitive accumulation” sees the origins of capitalism occurring out of a 
quantitative expansion of commerce as opposed to a qualitative shift in social relations of production. 
Marx critiques this notion and advocates for an understanding that distinguishes between wealth and 
capital and sees capital as a social relation as opposed to just an accumulation of wealth. This conflation 
can be seen in the account that Heller (2011) puts forth. Early in the book Heller states that “Capital 
existed under feudalism as it did in the slave mode of production” (12). This statement shows that for 
Heller, there is no difference between wealth and capital. This conflation of the terms also allows for 
him to conflate bourgeois with capitalist in the ways that were mentioned previously. This conflation is 
dangerous in a book that deals with The Birth of Capitalism because it leads to an understanding that 
capitalism came about not due to a shift in social relations, but simply a quantitative increase in the 
accumulation of wealth or capital as he defines it. Marx, in his dialectical approach, sees capital as much 
more than just wealth. He notes that “capital is a social relation” (Marx, 1977, p. 932) and therefore it 
would be hard to see how this social relation could have existed under feudalism, much less the slave 
mode of production.  Primitive accumulation is “so-called” for him because he understood that while 
the accumulation of wealth was a necessary precondition for the capitalist mode of production, it was 
far from sufficient. In order for wealth to be transformed into capital there needed to be a previous 
accumulation that occurred in conjunction with a transformation of social property relations. As Wood 
(2002) notes, “the specific precondition of capitalism is a transformation of social property relations that 
generates capitalist ‘laws of motion’: the imperatives of competition and profit maximization, a 
compulsion to reinvest surpluses, and a systematic and relentless need to improve labour productivity 
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and develop the forces of production” (36-37, emphasis in text). This shows that Marx, in his later years, 
had a much more nuanced conception of the transition that many authors have failed to grasp. 
Marxists on the Transition 
One of the most enduring and contentious debates among Marxists regarding the transition was 
between Paul Sweezy and Maurice Dobb. The central question between these two scholars was whether 
the prime mover in the transition to capitalism originated from within feudalism (class struggle), or 
whether it came about because of something outside of feudal relations (the development of 
commerce) (Heller, 2011, p. 23). Dobb argued that trade was “not in itself the solvent of feudalism” but 
that capitalism emerged because of the class struggle that existed between the peasants and the lords 
(Wood, 2002, p. 39). He suggests that the dissolution of feudalism and the subsequent rise of capitalism 
came about because of the liberation of petty commodity production that arose as a result of the class 
struggle. Sweezy, in his counterargument, contests that feudalism was very resistant to change and 
therefore the drive towards capitalist production had to come from the outside. With the growth of 
trade, there was a tension created between production for use and production for exchange. He 
acknowledges that this was not sufficient to bring about the capitalist mode of production. Sweezy 
believes that “[w]e usually think of a transition from one social system to another as a process in which 
the two systems directly confront each other and fight it out for supremacy” – but this was not the case 
in the transition to capitalism. It was a gradual shift that took place over centuries (seen in Wood, 2002, 
p. 40).  
The basic question that this debate revolved around was where the prime mover that drove the shift to 
capitalism took place. Was it to be found in the “basic, constitutive relations of feudalism, the relations 
between lords and peasants, or was it external to those relations, located primarily in the expansion of 
trade?” (Wood, 2002, p. 38). Dobb believes that the prime mover for transition is the antagonistic 
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relationship between lords and peasants while Sweezy believes this came from expanding trade (one 
supporting and the other critiquing the commercialization model). While this debate brought a great 
deal of attention and careful scholarship to the transition question among Marxists, they both had 
several shortcomings that made these accounts of the transition fall into similar traps that non-Marxists 
had fallen prey to. To begin with, both authors believed that there was the embryo of capitalist relations 
within feudalism. While they acknowledge that there was a rift that was created in social relations, their 
portrayals of the transition are still predicated on aspects of capitalist social relations existing within 
feudalism. In addition to this, they both have a trans-historical view of the market and see it as playing a 
similar role within both capitalism and feudalism. Also, they both continue to see the market as an 
opportunity, as opposed to an imperative that people were compelled to adhere to. This view gives the 
impression that the Yeoman more or less freely chose to go down the capitalist road once the fetters of 
feudalism were removed as opposed to the case that they had no choice but to adhere to the logic of a 
capitalist market in order to reproduce themselves. 
Another influential Marxist that has contributed to this debate is Perry Anderson. Anderson posits that 
the crisis of feudalism was resolved by the creation of an absolutist state. In his account the absolutist 
state acted to centralize and concentrate the politically coercive powers of the feudal lords that were 
previously parceled and fragmented. He believes that this absolutist state was essential to the rise of 
capitalism and that this state was essentially a feudal one, but that it displaced upward the feudal 
coercive power that existed at the time. This shift in power served to break the unity between economic 
and political coercion that was characteristic of the feudal state. It also liberated the commodity 
economy and the bourgeois society that had existed in the interstices of feudalism to develop on their 
own terms (Anderson, 1974). Wood (2002) believes that this separation between economic and political 
coercion did not necessarily take place. She notes that one can view the monarchical state itself as a 
form of property that appropriates surpluses from the peasants in the form of taxes while the lord 
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appropriates rent. Another flaw with this conception is that the English state never experienced the 
absolutist state on its path to capitalism. When boiled down though, Anderson’s thesis is still just a 
refinement of the commercialization model. The bourgeois, when freed from the fetters of the feudal 
mode of production with the absolutist state, developed and created a capitalist state (44-47). This 
position on the origins of capitalism still leaves the question of what took place in order to transform 
commerce into capitalism (wealth into capital) unanswered and simply assumed. 
As can be seen above, the transition debate is a contentious one that has been taking place for decades 
even among Marxists. All the approaches listed above fall short in one critical aspect: they take as a 
given the very thing that they are trying to explain (they naturalize capitalist relations). These accounts 
either see kernels of capitalist relations within previous modes of production or see the advent of 
capitalism simply as a quantitative increase in the activities that were taking place before the advent of 
capitalism. Both these explanations do not see capitalism as a unique system that has its own logics, but 
instead sees it either as human society reaching its potential, or a gradual shift that has been taking 
place over centuries that does not require a unique explanation. They therefore do not offer a sufficient 
explanation of the drastic ways in which society is different today than at any point before. In order to 
be able to offer an explanation of the origins of capitalism that sees it as a different system operating on 
a different logic, one must be very careful to denaturalize capitalist relations. This simply means that it is 
very specific about what capitalist relations consist of and is careful not to see vestiges of those relations 
in other forms of social organization. The second area where I feel that a more holistic approach to 
analyzing the origins of capitalism will be different is in the way that it separates the internal and 
external relations of capitalist production. The advantage that this allows for is that the origins of 
capitalism can be seen to take place in a specific location and time, and it does not necessarily take 
every connection between time, place, and the external world as capitalist. Both of these points will be 
elaborated on in greater detail in the upcoming section. 
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A more holistic account 
There is a school of thought within Marxism that keeps these issues at the forefront and presents an 
account of the transition that is very careful to denaturalize capitalist relations and therefore trace the 
origins of this system as a unique one that came not from a quantitative increase in trade, but as a result 
of qualitative changes in the social relations that existed. This account is put forth by the school of 
thought known as Political Marxism. These authors trace the root of capitalism to a very specific time 
and place. They believe that capitalism, as an economic system, originated in rural England over the 
span of the 16th and 17th century.  This does not mean that they discount or take for granted other 
external processes that took place and their relationship to the development of capitalism, but this 
account does posit that we can, in fact, trace the origins of the capitalist mode of production to a 
specific place. The later spread of this mode of production is also addressed, but that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. These accounts are very careful to ensure that they do not see vestiges of capitalist 
principles in pre-capitalist societies. They acknowledge that capitalism is a system that operates on its 
own logic and therefore does not transition without social, political, and cultural rifts being created from 
previous modes of production. In short, this account shows that there was a qualitative change that 
occurred in tandem with the quantitative increase that took place to usher in the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Brenner’s account 
Brenner’s (2003) account is one that “focused on the varying configurations of social property relations 
that determined the divergent effects, in different contexts, of other factors (whose importance he did 
not dismiss)  such as demographic cycles or the expansion of trade” (Wood, 2002, p. 52). He was 
searching for an internal dynamic that existed within feudalism that led to the advent of capitalism 
without presupposing an already existing capitalist logic within feudalism. Class struggle plays an 
important role in his account. He is careful not to insinuate that the class struggle that existed within 
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feudal societies led to the liberation of any impulses towards capitalist production and social relations. 
“Instead, it is a matter of lords and peasants, in certain specific conditions peculiar to England, 
involuntarily setting in train a capitalist dynamic while acting, in class conflict with each other, to 
reproduce themselves as they were. The unintended consequence was a situation in which producers 
were subjected to market imperatives” (52, emphasis in text). This analysis sees the market as 
something that imposed its logic on the producers who were simply trying to adjust to a situation that 
was changing over time. With the enclosures and other parliamentary changes taking place, the 
peasants were forced to rely heavily on the market to reproduce themselves. Therefore, as this change 
in the role of the market was taking place, peasants, in their attempts to survive, began depending on 
the market for almost everything which inadvertently set in motion a capitalist logic (Brenner, 2003). 
This account will be expanded in the next section which aims to briefly summarize the ideas put forth 
both by Brenner and the rest of the school of Political Marxism. 
As was noted earlier, Political Marxism believes that the transition to capitalism took place in a specific 
place (rural England) and at a specific time. It posits that this took place not because capitalist 
imperatives were finally allowed to take root and dominate, but because the social, political, and 
economic conditions in England during the time of the transition were suitable for the inception of a 
capitalist market. The following sections will bring to light some of the unique characteristics that 
allowed for the creation of the relations and ethos that is fundamental to a capitalist mode of 
production. This logic would then expand because of the competitive pressure that is unique in scope to 
other modes of production. When the feudal mode of production came up against the capitalist one, the 
capitalist one tended to be more efficient and therefore typically prevailed over the feudal one. This is a 
very basic understanding of the way that capitalism spread, but it is better able to account for the global 
spread of capitalist social relations than other notions of its spread that posit that there were kernels of 
these relations in other societies that were fettered by social and political relations and therefore not 
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allowed to break through. The following section will expand on Brenner’s framework that was 
introduced and show how the transition to capitalism was a unique event that arose in the countryside 
in England. This section will show how capitalism was not just an increase in commercial activity, but 
was a fundamental reorganization of not just the economic sphere, but social and political spheres as 
well. 
2.1.2 Origin of Capitalism 
As was mentioned earlier, England had characteristics within its social, political, and economic structure 
that made it well suited to bring about the transition towards capitalism. One of the characteristics of 
the English system that allowed for this was the unique role that the landlords played in society. In 
England, when compared to their counterparts in France, landlords owned a very large proportion of 
land and they also tended to own the best land. This allowed them a certain degree of autonomy from 
the political realm in the ways in which they could extract surpluses from the peasants. This meant that 
they no longer relied on extra-economic forms of coercion to extract surpluses, but could do so by 
relying on the leases of their land which were based more on their productivity as opposed to customary 
or traditional rates. This change in the terms of leases was paramount to bringing in the capitalist mode 
of production. The shift from leases based on customary rates to leases based on the productivity of the 
land made both the producers (tenants) and the landlords dependent on the market in historically 
unprecedented ways for their own reproduction1. This created a climate where they both had a stake in 
creating the conditions for “improvement” in the ways in which the land was used, and this was critical 
to creating the competitive pressure that is inherent to capitalism. This shows that in Brenner’s 
conception of the origins of capitalism, the role that the market plays is central. There is an imperative 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that while this account does see the transition as taking place in a specific time period, it 
does not see the transition that has an exact moment in which feudal relations became capitalist. There was an 
interim period where both methods of organizing society existed side by side, but because of the competitive 
pressures that are inherent to capitalism, it became the one that dominated. This can also be seen of the role the 
market played. There was a transformation that took place in the role that the market played in people’s lives that 
took time to cement itself.  
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to turn to the market that is unprecedented and the particular social and political climate in England was 
ripe for capitalism not to break through, but for its logics to be birthed. The market is not seen as a 
result of the proletarianization that took place, but rather a cause for it and the change in the role of the 
market marks a fundamental qualitative distinction in the way that society reproduced itself (Wood, 
2002, p. 60).  
There are two further unique aspects within England that allowed for the birth of capitalism. The first is 
the role of the state. The monarchy in England was significantly more unified than the states of other 
European powers at the time. This unification took place because the fragmentation of political power 
by “post-feudal military powers, fragmented legal systems, and corporate producers who insisted on 
their autonomy” was increasingly concentrated in a central state (Woods, 2002, 98). This centralization 
laid the foundation for England to possess infrastructure that surpassed those of other European states. 
In terms of social relations, the unified English state made the role of the English ruling class distinctive 
when compared to their European counterparts. First the ruling class was demilitarized. This happened 
because the unified state in England took monopoly control over the use of force. This stripped the 
ruling class of their ability to enact extra-economic coercion on the people who were working their land. 
This led to the ruling class, in conjunction with the state, to compel people to work through strictly 
economic means. The second unique feature of the English ruling class was the concentration of 
ownership of land that existed in England that was mentioned before. A few land owners in England 
owned “an unusually large amount of land that was worked [not] by non-peasant-proprietors but by 
tenants” (99). This combined with their loss of extra-economic powers of coercion led landowners to 
compel their tenants to increase the productivity of the land they cultivated in order to extract more 
surplus.  
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This unified state along with a ruling class that was stripped of their extra economic means of coercing 
labour led to a restructuring of rent that is extremely telling of the new role that markets play in 
capitalist societies. While there were many different variations on how rent was set, one that was 
becoming more prominent in England was rent based not on tradition or legal standards, but rents 
based on market conditions. The price of land was no longer fixed based on any arbitrary standard, but 
was instead set based on the productivity of the land. This was backed by Locke’s notion of 
“Improvement” which will be expanded on in the coming section. This new system of rent created a 
market in leases and was the starting point of the competitive pressures that are endemic to capitalism. 
Landowners would lease their land to the highest bidder and this created enormous pressure on the 
tenant to improve productivity in order to remain competitive and be able to renew their lease when 
the terms were completed. While this new method of leasing was taking root, it went hand in hand with 
an increased dependency on the market that is also endemic of capitalism. The new system of leases 
created a situation where both the tenant and the landlord were increasingly reliant on the market for 
their reproduction. When the rents were no longer based on customary traditions, both the landlord 
and tenant were now tied to the market and connected more to the price of the goods being produced 
(exchange value) as opposed to the functionality of the goods (use value). This shift in value system 
started in the English countryside and was very instructive as to the potential direction that society 
would take in the centuries to follow. The second unique characteristic that took place epitomizes this 
shift in value relations; it was the enclosure movement. 
 The enclosure movement was one where land that was previously held and managed by the commons 
was privatized. The enclosure movement epitomizes the transition from land being used to reproduce 
society (used to produce use values) to it being used primarily as a means to gain a profit (exchange 
value). This was again in line with Locke’s notion of improvement that helped to usher in new 
conceptions of property. It meant the removal of old customs and traditions that interfered with the 
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most productive use of land. Improvement versus traditional uses of land often came into legal 
loggerheads, and when taken to the courts, judges often recognized the validity of the ethic of 
improvement and sided with strengthening property rights. Locke’s notion of property is telling here. 
For him it is not labour that ends up being the source of value, but the productivity of property that is 
instrumental in his formulation. His view of property, with its emphasis on productivity and exchange 
value created in production, made his conception unique for the time. He believed that the labour that 
was put into improving the land served as sufficient justification for enclosing on it and privatizing it. He 
was critical of both the aristocrats who simply collected rent and the merchants who would survive by 
buying cheap and selling dear. His ideal was the new type of landlord that was created by the new social 
relations that capitalism was bringing about. He praised the industrious landlord who was constantly 
striving to improve their lands by increasing the productivity through either technological innovations or 
improved methods of working the land (Locke, 2001). 
These two aspects differentiated England from the rest of Europe and created the conditions necessary 
for capitalism to begin. Temporally, in the quest to denaturalize capitalist relations, it is important to 
note that the origination of capitalism, while it did not happen overnight, was not a process that was 
drawn out over many millennia as some accounts suggest (Frank & Gills, 1996). When one attempts to 
trace the roots of capitalist social relations to many centuries before it actually existed, one is 
extrapolating capitalist relations onto other modes of production and therefore naturalizing capitalist 
relations. Another important aspect of denaturalizing capitalism is the understanding that capitalism 
wasn’t a system that had “failed attempts” in other parts of the globe because of some political, social, 
or economic circumstance that fettered the growth of capitalism. In positing such views one is guilty of a 
teleological approach that all societies are heading towards a capitalist mode of production and that 
their drive towards this goal was hindered by some event or situation. One must be careful to see the 
development of each society as a unique combination of events that were particular to the social, 
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political, and economic system that was in place in that particular place at that particular time. 
Capitalism originated in the English countryside because of a very particular set of conditions that 
allowed it to emerge and then take root. It created a new social dynamic that is unique and qualitatively 
changed the way that the vast majority of society reproduced itself. A central distinction in the 
qualitative aspect of capitalism is the existence of capital. Authors often conflate wealth and capital and 
this conflation often leads to an analysis that naturalizes capital’s logic in previous modes of production. 
It is important to make the distinction between wealth and capital in any study of the origins of 
capitalism to truly trace the inception of the social relations that are necessary to support capital.  
As Marx notes, “Capital is a social relation” (Marx, 1977, p. 932). This implies that in order for capital to 
exist, it requires a social structure and relations that are specific to it in order for it to perpetuate itself. 
Wealth on the other hand requires a different set of social relation and has existed in many other modes 
of organizing society (including capitalism). Wolf (1985) sums up the difference succinctly when he notes 
that “wealth in the hands of holders of wealth is not capital until it controls mean of production, buys 
labour power, and puts it to work, continuously expanding surpluses by intensifying productivity 
through an ever-rising curve of technological inputs”(78). These characteristics that differentiate capital 
from wealth will be expanded on. The reason this is important in any discussion of the origins of 
capitalism is because the conflation of these two can be a major force in blurring the lines between 
previous modes of production and capitalism. This paper posits that capitalism is a unique system that 
exists on logics that are fundamentally different from any other that existed. This then logically follows 
that capital (the building block of capitalism) is a unique entity that is also unprecedented in human 
history. It is in recognizing this difference that the majority of subscribers to the commercialization 
model fall short in their ability to show the distinct character of the capitalist mode of production and 
the social relations that are necessary to perpetuate this system.  
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The distinction between wealth and capital is extremely important to differentiate between commerce 
and capitalism. While both of these methods of exchange require a market, commerce is based simply 
on trade while there is a very different logic at play in capitalism. Trade in this context is simply the 
exchange of reciprocal requirements. This can be done both as a means to reproduce oneself in order to 
get what one is lacking or it can be done with the pursuit of profit. When one is trading with the 
intention of profiting from the exchange, the profit is usually gained by “buying cheap and selling dear”. 
This method of exchange has taken place for many centuries and while it created a class of people 
(merchants) who made their livelihood through this, it did not create any systematic compulsion to alter 
the mode of production. The merchants who partook in this form of trade typically took advantage of 
geographic differences between places where they would buy and sell their products. In this mode of 
exchanging goods, circulation was the process that merchants drew their profits from. This meant that 
the low costs of grain production in the areas where it was produced did not produce competitive 
pressures on the wealthy states where it was imported and consumed. Therefore trading advantages 
that were gained during this time did not depend on production relations but on extra economic 
advantages like superior shipping, monopoly privileges, or elaborate commercial networks. This 
economy also allowed for peasants to own their primary means of production (land). Those extracting 
surpluses did not gain by taking ownership of the land or through dispossessing the peasants of their 
ability to reproduce themselves, but instead would only have to rely on extra economic forms of 
coercion to expropriate surpluses that were created (Wood, 2002, pp. 65–76). These features of a 
society that relied on trade without capitalism could not exist within capitalist social relations. This is 
important to realize in our attempt to denaturalize capitalism. 
The groundwork has been laid now to show the unique characteristics that England possessed that 
allowed for capitalism to originate there. Next, this paper will outline some of the major characteristics 
about the capitalist mode of production that allows us to differentiate it from other modes of organizing 
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society. The two unique aspects of capitalism that this paper will focus on are the role of the market and 
the notion of private property. The first aspect of capitalism that is unique is the role that the market 
plays. While markets have existed in previous modes of production, it has taken on a unique role in 
capitalism. Within capitalism, people are dependent on the market for their survival. Those who don’t 
own the means of their own reproduction need to sell their labour on the market in order to earn 
money that they can then use to buy commodities (again, on the market) to reproduce themselves. This 
occurs tangentially with the capitalists depending on the market to get the labour that they need in 
order to produce commodities that they then sell on the market. This new dependency on the market 
brings to the forefront elements of society that, while they might have existed in the background in 
previous modes of organization, become imperatives that the vast majority of the population have no 
choice but to succumb to. These elements are: “the imperatives of competition, accumulation, and 
profit maximization, and hence a constant and systematic need to develop the productive forces” 
(Wood, 2002, p. 92). This new role that the market plays in society is drastically different from the way 
in which the market operated historically. As Polanyi (2001) notes, historically markets have been 
embedded in society and have been an opportunity for people to gain access to the things that they did 
not produce themselves. With the advent of the capitalist market, the market became a compulsion that 
forced people to adhere to its particular logic in order to survive. The market was no longer something 
that people willingly chose to trade in, but became something that was impossible to live without. This 
change in the role of the market is unique to capitalism and is a central tenet to the capitalist mode of 
production. This new dependence on the market was, in large part, brought about by the new 
conceptions of property that were being adopted at the time. This shift in the role of the market 
signalled not just a quantitative increase in the activity that took place within the sphere of the market, 
but a qualitative shift in the role that the market played in society. It was not just that the markets 
became bigger and therefore made room for capitalism to originate, but that markets took on an 
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unprecedented role in the reproduction of society and therefore created the conditions for capitalism to 
be birthed. 
The second unique characteristic is the introduction of private property and its role in people’s lives. 
Although people owned property prior to the establishment of capitalist relations, ownership was not as 
cemented as it began to be under capitalism. This was especially the case with land, the majority of 
which was commonly used and managed before the introduction of capitalist social and property 
relations. With the advent of capitalism however, land became privatized and the use of the land was no 
longer managed by the people who inhabited the area, but instead by those who held the property 
rights to the land. This meant that the most basic means of production (the land) was now privately 
owned and regulated and, as was mentioned earlier, not necessarily used for the reproduction of 
society, but instead it was used to extract the most exchange value out of it. This new notion of property 
also ushered in an era where there was a great focus on the notion of “improvement”.  This 
“improvement” was, as mentioned earlier, fundamentally tied to the role that markets played in 
people’s lives. These two conditions set the backdrop for the introduction of capitalism that, as was 
defined earlier is a system where the capitalists own the means of production, the peasants are denied 
access to their primary means of reproduction, and there is a competitive pressure to continually 
improve output. This account of the transition however, is not without its critiques. This paper will now 
analyze one of the most prevalent criticisms that is levelled against the school of Political Marxism: the 
accusation that it is guilty of Eurocentrism. 
One of the most prevalent criticisms levelled against the school of Political Marxism is that it is 
Eurocentric. Anievas & Nisancioglu (2013) bring to light some of the main propositions put forth by 
these critiques. They define Eurocentrism as having “four interrelated assumptions about the form and 
nature of modern development”. The first assumption places the origins of capitalist modernity as a 
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result of developments that took place primarily internal to Europe. This causes the second assumption 
where the development of Europe is seen as a superior “core” while the rest of the world is seen as the 
inferior “periphery” that has no agency. Third, eurocentrist theories put forth a predictive proposition 
that the experience of modernization in Europe creates the mould that other societies will eventually 
follow to reach a “higher” stage of development. Finally they put forth that there is also a stadial 
assumption that is created. Here “endogenous processes of social change are conceived as universal 
stages of a linear development” (81-82). Anievas & Nisancioglu (2013) go on to note that counter to this, 
“the anti-Eurocentrics move within the main methodological parameters set out by the original 
debate, accepting an essentially ‘externalist’ explanation of the origins of capitalism by 
highlighting the spread of commerce and markets as the ‘prime movers’. Nonetheless, what 
they have done, in creative and interesting ways, is to spatially decentre the causes of capitalism 
by moving away from the Eurocentric frameworks characterising both sides of the earlier 
debates” (81) 
The critique that Political Marxism is guilty of Eurocentrism is a serious one and therefore the four 
critiques of Eurocentric thought will be applied to the school of Political Marxism to see where the 
theory falls short and how it can be adjusted to ensure that Europe isn’t prioritized in any ahistorical 
way. 
The first assumption that Anievas & Nisancioglu (2013) put forth is that the development of capitalism 
took place as a result of developments that took place internally. In this, Political Marxism is partially 
guilty. While it does trace the roots of the transition to capitalism as taking place at a particular place 
and time, it does not isolate its lens of focus to just that region. In this, Brenner (2003), who is often 
seen as one of the main thinkers in this school of thought, dedicates a large section of his book 
Merchants and Revolution to the relationship that England had with overseas traders and the ways in 
which this allowed for some of the necessary but insufficient factors that led to the transition. This study 
ranges from studying the relationship that England had with the rest of Europe and the rest of the world 
and the role that the colonial relationship played in bringing about the wealth that existed in England. 
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Therefore, while this account does focus on the events that transpired in England (because that is where 
the first instance of capitalist social relations manifested itself) it recognizes that England was not 
operating in a vacuum. It sees the relationship that England had with the rest of the world as crucial to 
creating some of the necessary conditions, but is still careful in its attempt to denaturalize capitalist 
relations to ensure that capitalist relations are not extrapolated to other parts of the world.  
The second assumption where Europe is seen to be as the superior core while the rest of the world is 
inferior is one that the school of Political Marxism can hardly be found guilty of. This school of thought is 
extremely critical of capitalist relations and therefore accusing England of being the birthplace of 
capitalist social relations is not recognition of its superiority. With this, it is also important to recognize 
that while there is definitely a focus on England in the transition, the accounts and the ways in which 
other nations and regions contributed to the transition is not taken for granted.  
In the third instance, Eurocentric theories are those that place a predictive proposition in which the 
experience of modernization in England developed in a certain way and created a mould that the rest of 
the world would follow. This is explicitly rejected in Political Marxism. The entire thrust to denaturalize 
capitalist relations is done for the purpose of avoiding this. In denaturalizing capitalist relations Political 
Marxism recognizes that each society develops in a certain way because of the internal and external 
conditions that exist. Capitalism is not seen as the pinnacle of social organization and therefore each 
society will develop differently.   
The final assumption that Anievas & Nisancioglu (2013) put forth is that the “endogenous processes of 
social change are conceived as universal stages of a linear development” (82). Political Marxism avoids 
this in the same way that it avoids the previous assumption that Eurocentric theories are guilty of. The 
work of Phillips (1989) is very instructive in breaking down the way all these assumptions are not an 
inherent part of the school of Political Marxism. She studies the relations that existed between England 
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and West Africa and notes that even though capitalist England helped organize the slave trade and then 
colonized West Africa, it was not a relationship which forced the West Africans into developing capitalist 
social relations. She notes that there was an extremely important relationship that existed between 
these two geographic areas that was extremely favourable to England and that this was essential to the 
origins of capitalism in England. But she is also careful to note that just because capitalism was born off 
the backs of the relationships that England had with the Global South, it still originated in England. This 
process allows for maintaining the importance of the global relationships that existed, but still traces the 
origins of capitalism to England where it was birthed. It is important to note that the reason it is 
important to trace the roots of capitalism to England does not stem from any Eurocentric or orientalist 
vein, but in order to be historically accurate. The physical location where the first time capitalist 
relations came about was in England. While the relationship England had with the rest of the world was 
paramount in creating the conditions necessary for capitalism to be birthed, it was, in fact, in England 
that capitalist social relations (as understood by political Marxism) were first created. 
While the school of Political Marxism traces the roots of capitalism to England and attributes the 
reasons why this happened to primarily dynamics that were internal to England, it does not see Europe 
as an isolated vacuum that is unaffected by its relationships with the outside world. It also does not use 
Europe as a predictive pedestal to judge the way other countries develop or see capitalism as the most 
advanced form of society that all societies are striving for. It does, however take the history of the 
transition very seriously and is careful to ensure that capitalist social relations are not naturalized and 
seen in other societies where the conditions for capitalism to be birthed were present. While it is 
extremely important to ensure that any account of history is not centered around and focused on 
European events, it is equally important to ensure that one is objective in their analyses of the events 
that transpired in history in order to ensure that the record is accurate. Chibber (2013) demonstrates 
the importance of this in his scathing study on postcolonial theory. He definitively shows that the school 
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of postcolonial theory, which was created to combat eurocentrism, was formed based on assumptions 
that were faulty and that the theories that have come out of that school of thought are historically 
inaccurate.  Therefore a certain level of nuance is required in any historical analysis. While one must be 
careful not to see Europe as the centre of the universe, it is equally important to recognize that Europe 
had a unique role in the world during the transition and that this allowed for capitalism to originate 
from there. This transition to capitalism created new social conditions that paved the way for the 
development of new needs and wants by both individuals and society as a whole. The next section will 
deal with some of the ways in which this transition affected the people and the society in which it took 
root and the world in general as it spread.  
Given all of this, the question that must be asked is how this theory of the origin of capitalism and the 
way that it has theorized capital is connected to the notion of alienation. While this will be explored in 
greater detail in the last section of this paper, it is important to note that the value theories within this 
school of thought are central to the notion of alienation. In this, the work of Knafo (2007) is extremely 
instructive. While this paper focuses on the labour theory of value and the way in which it can be 
interpreted using the lens of Political Marxism, the three conclusions that he draws are useful in 
connecting Political Marxism’s interpretation of the transition and alienation. His first conclusion is in 
noting that value theory is not, as it is interpreted by some Marxists, a strictly economic method. The 
illusion that markets are solely determined by quantitative factors is itself central to creating the 
alienation that exists in the capitalist market. A more holistic understanding of value will be able to 
incorporate other, notably political factors as well in understanding and combating alienation (82-90). 
His second conclusion deals with the agency in contributing to the assignation of value. Here he 
endeavours to explain how the problem of value – and alienation – is determined above all by struggle, 
in particular the contested ways in which people can inadvertently value in terms of labour and that the 
ability of capitalists to reorganize the labour process in a context of inter-capitalist competition (95-96). 
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The third proposition put forth by Knafo (2007) is regarding the way this new reading of value theory 
fundamentally alters political Marxism’s approach to value theory. Linking this school of thought with 
value theory offers an avenue to historicize the problem of value and alienation in relationship to both 
the origins of capitalism and the social transformations within capitalism itself, both of which are not 
just determined by economic factors (99-100).   
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2.2 On Human Nature 
The transition that took place was the outcome of the actions of a society that was responding to 
changing dynamics and logics that were being forced upon people. While the transition was not the 
outcome of individual human actions, it was the outcome of the societal response to the varying 
conditions. The transition had a dialectical relationship to the people that lived in England during the 
period of the transition. While the people who lived within that society directly influenced the direction 
and scope of the transition, the people were simultaneously influenced and shaped by the changes that 
were taking place during the transition. Marx & Engels (1970) note one side of this relationship when 
they say that “History does nothing… [it] is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to 
achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims” (Seen in Sayers, 1998, 
p. 163). It is the other side of this dialectic relationship that will be explored in this section. This section 
will deal with some of the extra-economic impacts of the transition to capitalism. In particular, it will 
explore the impact the transition to capitalism has, and continues to have, on the people who live under 
it. The purpose of this section is to understand who these people are - not as individuals, or even as a 
society acting at a particular time under particular circumstances, but to understand people as a whole. 
To look into the concept of human nature and understand where the motivation and incentive to do the 
things we do comes from is extremely important in understanding the notion of alienation because, in 
its essence, alienation is a theory about how humans have been fettered by the capitalist mode of 
production in our drive for self-realization. This section will introduce a few of the most prominent 
theories regarding human nature and show how Marx’s concept of it was a more holistic one that 
considered us as humans as a unique and extremely complicated set of actors. This section will begin 
with Hegel because of the significance of his social theory in influencing others, including Marx. 
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2.2.1 Social Theories of Hegel and Marx 
Hegel begins his Philosophy of Right with the statement that “What is rational is actual and what is 
actual is rational” (Hegel, 1821, p. 10). This statement, taken in isolation, portrays (and rightly so) an 
extremely conservative social statement. In this light this statement acts as a justification for the status 
quo. It justifies everything that currently exists as rational and therefore not needing to be questioned 
or challenged. This falls in line with some of Hegel’s other ideas (i.e. his justification that things are the 
way they are because of divine providence) and therefore has roots that extend to beyond this single 
statement. However, there is a radically different side to Hegel as well. This other side comes about 
when we realize that Hegel has another term that creates a distinction between what actually exists and 
what is the actual essence of the phenomena being studied. This distinction will be expanded shortly, 
but Hegel, despite his conservative overtones, puts forth a scientific understanding of the social sphere 
and argues that this sphere need not be relegated to the subjective realm, but instead can be 
approached morally and critically. He rejects the subjective theme that exists within Kantian philosophy 
and the notion that the order and necessity that exist are merely our ‘way of seeing things’. Kant draws 
this from the fact that because the natural world is governed by laws that are external to ourselves, we 
can study this objectively, but because the social world is created and governed by laws and rules that 
are made by men and women, it is wrong to look at these objectively. Hegel criticizes this approach 
because it leads to an understanding of and interaction with the social realm that is “passive” and 
“acquiescent”. Hegel agrees that the human world is distinct from the natural world in the role that 
consciousness plays, but he “rejects the idea that reason is a transcendent and absolute quality” that 
creates a distinct gulf between the two. He sees human consciousness not as purely determined by 
some natural superior forces, instead as historical and social products (Sayers, 1998, pp. 95–98). One 
must be careful because Hegel’s theory is shrouded in a “mystical shell” in which he not only tried to 
understand society, but also to justify it because he believes that world history is governed by divine 
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providence and therefore any criticism of it is futile. This serves to justify the status quo and therefore 
falls in line with the conservative reading of his opening statements in The Philosophy of Right. 
While it is important to be conscious of this thread of justifying the status quo that is weaved through 
the fabric of his social theory, there are kernels of a critical approach that he introduces that are 
extremely useful. He does not expand on these because of the fetter that religion plays on his thought. 
So while he believes that the actual is rational and vice versa, he introduces a third term to show that 
this is not a simple case of justification of what is. This third term is existence. This third term signifies a 
lower form of being that falls short of the actual “essence” of the thing. Sayers (1998) coherently 
describes the distinction between actual and existing things: “An existing thing is actual only when its 
existence is in harmony with its essence; when its existence corresponds with its proper notion, function 
or idea. On the other hand, ‘when this unity is not present, a thing is not actual even though it may have 
acquired existence’” (101). Another term Hegel uses to make these ideas more coherent is the term 
Truth. Truth, for Hegel, represents correctness. He notes that “Truth in the deeper sense consists in the 
identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense of truth that we speak of a true 
state, or a true work of art. These objects are true if they are as they ought to be; i.e. if their reality 
corresponds with their notion” (Seen in Sayers, 1998, p. 99). Although this might seem redundant at 
first, Hegel notes that this term is often used in daily parlance as well. We often speak of a “true” friend 
who is different from a regular friend because their “manner of conduct accords with the notion of 
friendship (Seen in Sayers, 1998, p. 100) 
The addition of these extra terms gives Hegel’s statement a depth that does not exist when the 
sentence is taken in isolation. It shows that just because something exists, it is not necessarily true and 
therefore not the thing in actuality, but instead a lower (or bad) form of it. This insinuates that 
everything that exists has not reached its true state and is therefore open to criticism. This is the critical 
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and dialectical thread that exists in the fabric of Hegelianism. It is these threads which Marx and Engels 
will build on in order to create a system of thought that is critical but does not attempt to justify the way 
society has progressed. Therefore in order for something to be without contradiction it must not only 
exist, but it must also be rational and true. Marx uses this to critique the existing state in noting that its 
existing form is a bad version of the actual and true form (for him the socialist state). He notes that the 
state must be criticized for the ways it falls short of the ideal, but he is also careful not to fall into the 
Kantian trap involving a priori or subjective ideals. There is for Marx an objective notion of the state 
which has an essence that the current state falls short of (Marx, 1993). The problem in this case is only 
shifted elsewhere. As Sayers (1998) notes, “although the actual may be rational, by no means all that 
exists is rational and actual. The question remains of how far this tautological notion of rational actuality 
is applicable to the existent world around us” (102). To continuously hold things that currently exist as 
“bad” to some potential “good” seems futile and utopian. The purpose of the social sciences should 
instead strive to understand the world that currently exists and how it came to be that way in order to 
meaningfully move in a direction that leads to a better society and this is where Marx’s method is 
extremely useful. 
Another area that Hegel falls short is where he assigns agency in society and the factors that shape it. 
Because of his dogmatic reliance on religion he believes that it is the ideal or the idea that presupposes 
society, i.e. that the idea comes first and that only when it is implemented or practiced that the 
contradictions and particulars of that idea are realized. This gives agency to ideas in shaping society and 
is dangerous because it is a slippery slope from this to a Kantian notion of society which Hegel rejects. 
Marx outright rejects this causal relationship that Hegel proposes. He believes that the agency acts in 
the opposite direction and therefore turns Hegel’s notion “on its feet”. He notes that “For Hegel, the life 
process of the human brain […] is the demiurgos [creator] of the real world and the real world is only the 
external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me […] the idea is nothing else than the material world 
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reflected by the human brain, and transformed into forms of thought” (Marx, 1977, p. 19). Here Marx 
states that it is not the idea which comes first and shapes society, but the opposite. Our ideas and 
notions of what society is and should be are formed and shaped by the society in which we live. Our 
ideas are subjected to the objective reality (society) in which we live. Marx goes on to note that “in 
direct contrast to German [Hegelian] philosophy, which descends from heaven to Earth, here we ascend 
from Earth to heaven […] We set out from the real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process 
we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process” (Marx & 
Engels, 1970, p. 47). This shows that it is society that creates the circumstances in which we create the 
ideas and ideals of society. Although sometimes this can lead Marx on a teleological journey of the 
shape of future societies, there is an avenue of his thought that does not take that path, but instead 
uses a relative and historic understanding of capitalist society in order to create a meaningful critique of 
capitalism. As Sayers (1998) notes, “Marx does not set out to judge capitalism against any pre-
established moral values, nor to posit an ideal socialist state of the future. Rather, he attempts to 
understand and explain in scientific terms the working of existing capitalist society. […] In this way – by 
exposing, articulating, and analysing the critical and revolutionary tendencies and forces already at work 
in the world – Marx provides the most powerful and effective critique of capitalism: a scientific critique” 
(110). This scientific critique of capitalism is extremely useful in its ability to factor in subjective aspects 
of a society while maintaining that even something as subjective as the society that we live in can be 
objectively critiqued and questioned. The next section will continue to lay the groundwork for Marx’s 
scientific critique of capitalism by introducing us to his views on morality.  
2.2.2 Marxism and Morality 
The discussion on Marx’s social theory is instructive to give a glimpse into how his theory of human 
nature comes about. In order to tackle this issue, this paper will first analyze Marx’s stance on morality 
and connect that to his theory of human nature as a whole. The issue of morality and Marxism has been 
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contentious. One school of thought believes that Marxism offers a strictly scientific account of society 
and therefore has no room for assessing and analyzing any appeals to moral principles. This school 
believes that morality is only a reflection of social conditions and therefore judging a society on moral 
terms results in a form of relativism that Marxists in general condemn. The other side of the coin 
believes that Marx lodges a critique of capitalism that is based on the injustices of capital’s logic and 
therefore is inherently a moral critique. It appears that both of these schools of thought fall into the trap 
of missing the forest for the trees. Marx, in his criticism of capitalism, does both. He offers a scientific 
analysis of capital and its relations while simultaneously lodging a moral critique against it. These two 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. His purpose with morality is to situate and understand it, as 
opposed to critique it. Sayers (1998) puts it succinctly when he notes “Marxism does not involve a moral 
approach to history; but rather a historical approach to morality” (116). This means that it does not 
appeal to a universal set of moral principles or values from which he critiques capitalism, but instead 
believes that morality is a social and historical phenomenon. This interpretation of Marxism opens it up 
to critiques that Marxism then becomes a strictly relativist approach because there are a number of 
different and conflicting alternative moralities that all have equal claim to validity. This critique, as 
Sayers (1998) notes, views society as a monolithic structure that imparts the same influence on all of its 
members. Marx does not view society in this way. He notes that our society is full of contradictions and 
inequalities and underlying all this is a class struggle caused by the uneven way in which society treats 
different members of society. While this alone does not overcome the relativism of Marx’s theory, this 
in conjunction with his thoughts on progress and historical development show that this is not just a 
subjective approach in which all theories have the same validity. His theory does not portray history as 
an arbitrary sequence of social systems that have succeeded each other, but puts forth that the order in 
which they occurred was as it was because of the social conditions that existed at various points in 
history. Therefore there is an objectivity that goes along with his theory. However, it is important to 
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note that in Marx’s earlier writings he is guilty of going too far down the objective path. This is evident in 
his teleological notion of progress that is present in his earlier work. This being noted, however, it is 
important to keep in mind that this does not take away from his assessment and treatment of morality 
and his assessment of capitalism. 
Marx uses this notion of progress not to justify capitalism, but instead to level a historical assessment of 
capitalism. So while feudalism need not necessarily have given rise to the capitalist mode of production, 
that is the chronological order in which these systems existed and therefore his assessment of 
capitalism as more “progressive” than feudalism still holds some merit. This framework is useful in 
showing that capitalism, while it has many negative and extremely destructive tendencies, it has also 
progressed society in some very real ways. The amount of wealth that exists in the world today, the 
technological advances that have occurred, and from a moral standpoint the advances in equality and 
liberty for a vast majority of the population are things that came about through the capitalist mode of 
production. Marx is extremely critical of many of the things that exist within capitalism, but he also 
believes that capitalism was a necessary step on the road to a classless society. He believes that morality 
is a historical phenomenon that has progressed in tandem with societal progress and that this trend will 
continue until socialism comes about. He uses the notion of private property as an example of this when 
he says: “from the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the globe by 
single individuals will appear quire as absurd as the private ownership of one man by another” (Marx & 
Engels, 1971, p. 776). Although this passage may be used to show that Marx is being moralistic by 
appealing to absolute standards, he is in fact noting the historical nature of morality. Here he shows that 
in previous societies private ownership of people (slavery) was commonplace and justified but that in 
our current one it seems incongruous. In the same way, in a future society the private ownership of land 
will seem absurd to members of that society even though it is taken as a truism for our current society 
44 
 
to operate. This does not prescribe a universal morality on all humans, but one that is conditioned, 
shaped, and created by the society in which we live.  
Marx’s stance on morality can be extrapolated to other areas of humanity as well. The most relevant for 
our purposes is the creation of new needs and wants in humans. Marx notes that by “acting on the 
external world, [man] at the same time changes his own nature” (Marx & Engels, 1971, p. 177). 
Therefore human nature is not an a-historical or absolute thing. It is affected by the society in which we 
live and is constantly changing and evolving within a particular mode of production as well. It is also 
important not to deny that there are some needs that remain constant regardless of the society in 
which one lives (the need to eat for example). Some philosophers argue that every “need” beyond bare 
survival is a false need. While these accounts can level a criticism against capitalism it is a shallow one 
that urges us to move backwards in the ways in which we live. Marx on the other hand does not label 
every need beyond mere survival as a regression, but sees that these needs can potentially create the 
conditions for a better life and have a positive influence on individuals and society as a whole. Again, 
this is not to say that all new needs that are created in society are justified, but that they should be 
considered historically and socially and judged in relation to the society in which one lives. 
This focus on morality gives a window into the development of the needs and wants that are strongly 
associated with human nature. We can apply the historical approach that was taken to understand 
morality to understand the transitional and social nature of human nature. We can draw parallels with 
the growth of morality over the centuries to the growth of human nature. This does not mean that at 
every stage in history the one that came after was a more moral one than the previous. This simply 
implies that the general trend that has taken place has been towards a greater morality and liberty as 
opposed to the opposite. As an example of this, the feudal social relations that existed for centuries 
legally bound a person to a certain role in society from birth (a peasant could not become a lord for 
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example). While there was some revolt against this system, it lasted for centuries and was seen as the 
norm for organizing society. As productive capacities grew and the appropriate circumstances came 
about, this shackling of members of society to particular roles was no longer necessary for society to 
reproduce itself and consequently there was a shift in the dominant ideology that ruled over society. 
While there is definitely room for improvement and growth, the legal equality of all humans under the 
law is something to be applauded and built upon. The replacement of feudalism with capitalism 
therefore created a new dominant morality that is better in some very important ways. It has therefore 
been instrumental in creating new needs among society but the realization of these new needs are 
fettered by the capitalist system itself.  
This last point will be discussed in the upcoming sections, but it is important to clarify here that Marx’s 
focus on technology and progress does not put him in the utilitarian school of thought. Here a quick 
word on Bentham and Mill’s thoughts on human nature will show the clear difference between the 
utilitarian conception of human nature and Marx’s. Bentham put forth the most straightforward and 
pure form of hedonism. For him, the goal of humanity is to increase satisfaction while minimizing pain. 
Happiness for him can be measured quantitatively and one form of happiness is the same as any other. 
He famously notes that “Quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry” (Seen in Sayers, 
1998, p. 142). His follower, Mill, had a similar framework with one important distinction. His theory of 
human nature rested on the “Greatest Happiness Principle” which states that “actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” 
(Mill, 1901, p. 6). Mill disagreed with Bentham in that he believed that the quality of happiness did 
matter and that not all forms of happiness are equal. He is famous for noting that it is “better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill, 1901, p9). This distinction made by Mill has been 
criticized for being irreconcilable with any form of utilitarianism; the critique being that his distinction 
introduces a subjective aspect that does not allow for the utilitarian vision of humans as calculating 
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beings who are only trying to gain the most pleasure while avoiding the most pain. Whether this is so 
and the ramifications for Mill’s theory are beyond the scope of the paper, but two important aspects of 
both these thinkers is that their notion of human nature is based primarily on the human being as a 
consumer and that the human being is seen as an individual who is acting solely for their own benefit. 
This is directly contrary to Marx’s ideas about human nature. For him, we are inherently productive 
beings and many of the pleasures and satisfactions from life are gained from producing things that the 
rest of society deems useful. In addition to this we are also fundamentally social beings. Sayers (1998) 
describes this characteristic well when he notes that “we are inherently and essentially social beings. We 
develop our natures – our individuality and freedom – only by participating in society, only in and 
through social relations. For liberty does not exist merely in the absence of social constraint; it is not a 
purely negative phenomenon. It also requires the presence – the positive existence – of the social 
conditions in which we can actually develop and use our powers and capacities” (7). Now that some of 
the inner workings of Marx’s method have been laid out, this paper will now explore Marx’s conception 
of human nature. 
2.2.3 Marx’s Concept of Human Nature 
Marx puts forth a theory of humanity that is both historical and social. This theory posits that the needs 
and wants of humans are formed and constantly in flux based on the society that we are a part of. This 
fluctuating and dependent aspect of human nature can be seen by the changes that have taken place in 
what constitutes a human right. Human rights as a framework have many problems that will not be 
addressed in this paper, but they can form a useful lens to show how the needs of humans have been 
altered by the society in which we live. While they do not necessarily indicate the things that are 
essential for survival, they do give an idea of what is deemed important socially in order to properly 
function as a member of society. The passing of the internet as a human right a few years back is very 
telling on this point. While it can easily be argued that one does not need the internet to survive or have 
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a meaningful life, it has become a need in order for us to function in society today. A personal anecdote 
on this matter was particularly telling. For the last 3 years my housemates and myself have lived without 
an internet connection at our house and for the vast majority of the time we did not have a data 
connection on any of our phones. This left us without any access to the internet while we were at home. 
While we survived and actually enjoyed being away from being constantly connected, the most common 
reaction that I got from telling people my situation was “How do your survive without the internet?”. Of 
course none of the people asking that question were concerned about our ability to live or reproduce 
ourselves, but the prevalence of social media and the place that the internet has taken in our lives, 
especially in western society, makes it appear that having access to the internet has become more than 
just a luxury. 
On the other hand, there are those who argue that human nature is trans-historical or that there exist 
traits in human beings that are ‘natural’ and ‘essential’ and are not based on social conditions. While 
Marxism acknowledges that these traits do in fact exist, it also recognizes that humans are much more 
complicated than just seeking to satisfy these base desires. We are much more than creatures that are 
on this earth simply to eat, shelter ourselves, and reproduce. Human nature has two elements: a 
universal one and a particular one. In delineating these two types of needs there is a large body of 
literature. One school of thought, the essentialist approach, believes that there are two distinct spheres 
that are only externally related. The one being what some authors refer to as, ‘minimal biological 
needs’, and the other being the needs that are socially developed (like the need for self-realization). The 
other account, the historicist approach, believes that it is not possible to distinguish between these 
needs. Instead of having two distinct spheres of needs, they believe that there is only one that 
encompasses both: The socially modified need. My contention is that what we actually are falls 
somewhere in the middle of these two ends. That while we do have minimal biological needs, those are 
also shaped and affected by the society in which we live. As Sayers (1998) puts it “Even our most basic 
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biological functions occur in a social context by which they are modified; and even our highest and most 
socially developed achievements are the activities of the biological organism that we, as human beings, 
are. Human beings are natural-social beings.” (154) 
These distinctions are important because of the role that they play in social theories and in their 
explanations of human nature. In the essentialist approach, it is universal human needs that take an 
explanatory role in the shape that society takes (i.e. in the productive and social relations that exist). 
Marx, on the other hand, while acknowledging the role that universal human needs play in compelling 
people towards productive activity, believes that these needs give very little insight into the specifics 
regarding how that productive activity takes place and the social relations that they create. He uses the 
universal aspects of human nature to describe ‘production in general’ or abstract notions of production. 
These are the starting points to understanding the whole picture of human nature. These needs give the 
foundation on which particular manifestations of society and the needs associated with that society are 
established. In order to understand specific social conditions, he believes that it is necessary to go past 
these and into more specific organizations in society in order to understand where and how these needs 
arise. These needs do not create the society in which we live, but the other way around. This is similar to 
the way Marx turned Hegel’s theory ‘on its feet’ that was mentioned before. Therefore as opposed to 
looking at production in general which will give an understanding of universal human needs, we must 
focus on specific modes of production in order to understand the specific, social, and historical needs 
that are created. The other criticism of this is that the essentialist approach cannot explain transitions 
between different economic systems. If universal human needs are the main driver of our production 
and social relations, why have these changed so drastically over time? The Marxist approach then does 
not reject the notion of a universal human nature, but instead “it is a form of humanism which gives 
moral values a realistic social and historical foundation” (Sayers, 1998, p. 159).  
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Here Marx puts forth two terms to describe these two aspects of human nature: “natural man” to 
outline some of the needs that are not specific to human beings and “species man” which describes the 
characteristics in humans that are specific for humans and not shared by other living things. In order to 
lay the foundation for exploring these two terms, Marx’s concept of “power” and “need” will be 
introduced. These terms, like many of Marx’s ideas, are not static entities and therefore any attempt to 
define them rigidly is futile, but an attempt will be made to give the reader a general understanding of 
what he means by these terms. Ollman (1976) notes that “the nearest ordinary language equivalents of 
‘power’, as used by Marx, are ‘faculty’, ‘ability’, ‘function’, and ‘capacity’” but that even these fall short 
of what Marx intended. He goes on to note that “’power’ also suggests potential, the possibility - 
particularly in changed conditions – of becoming more of whatever it already is” (76-77). Needs, on the 
other hand, when viewed apart from their relationship to powers, are relatively simple. They refer to 
“the desire one feels for something, usually something which is not immediately available” (77). The 
important point to make for needs is that humans not only have them objectively, but also feel them 
subjectively. There is a dialectical relationship that exists between needs and powers. Ollman sums it up 
well when he notes that “Each power is coupled in man with a distinctive need for the objects necessary 
for its realization, to make itself known and allow for its development as a power” (78). While “a power 
is whatever is used that ‘fulfills’ a need. To know any power is therefore to know its corresponding need 
and vice versa” (78). The needs that exist are dependent on the social and economic relations that exist, 
and the power to fulfill those needs are likewise limited by these same conditions. 
Those terms in place, Marx’s notion of Natural man and Species man will now be explored. Natural man 
is the term Marx uses to describe the tendencies and desires we have that are shared with other living 
creatures. Ollman (1976) notes that these natural powers have two outstanding characteristics. First, 
they exist as tendencies and abilities – as impulses. This is best understood by understanding that for 
“each natural power that he possesses man feels ‘impulses’ (needs) to realize or actualize it; he has 
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‘abilities’ which enable him to realize it; and he carries ‘tendencies’ which direct this realization towards 
particular goals” (80).  Second, that humans seek their fulfillment from outside rather than from within. 
While these two characteristics seem complex, they are characteristics that exist within all living 
creatures. Animals also feel the same tendencies and have the corresponding abilities to fulfil them 
which are sought externally to the animal. The idea of hunger and satisfying that by hunting is an 
example of animals feeling an impulse and acting external to themselves to satisfy it. Therefore Marx’s 
concept of ‘Natural man’, according to Ollman, is a conception that abstracts man from all that is 
particular to the species, to see man without intellectual abilities or self-awareness. Alongside this 
‘Natural man’ is also Marx’s concept of the ‘Species man”. Here, humans are distinguished from other 
animals in our consciousness. As Ollman (1976) notes, “man is a species being because he knows what 
only man can know, namely that he is the species being, man” (84). He goes on to note that humans 
confirm and manifest themselves as species being in two ways: 1. “by looking, sounding, smelling, 
feeling and, we may suppose, tasting like a man”; and 2. “through activity of a kind, quality, and pace, 
that could only be done by human beings” (84). While it can be easy to imagine the natural man without 
the species man, it is impossible to have a species being that does not have a natural being attached to 
it. It is the nature of our relationship with ourselves, others, and the environment that distinguishes us 
from other living organisms. Ollman again sums up this point succinctly: “If natural powers can be 
viewed as establishing the framework in which life itself goes on, then man’s species powers express the 
kind of life which man, as distinct from all other beings, carries on inside this framework” (85). It is 
important to note that while Marx uses two different terms he is not trying to separate these two to see 
which characteristics are natural and which are specific to the species. He sees all five senses as both 
because even though most other animals have them, the way in which we have developed and use our 
senses is specific to humans and therefore is distinguished from the way in which they have been 
developed and used in other species. 
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Marx’s account also links productive powers with human nature. It links productive powers and the 
relations associated with it to the creation of social relations and since social relations determine our 
needs, productive powers do so as well. But this view is not a one sided one. It is not just society that 
shapes human nature, but they both, dialectically, influence each other and therefore is much more 
complicated than a one sided notion of agency in either way. Sayer quotes Lichtman who put this 
process well: “we are simultaneously the subject and object of our own activity” (Sayers, 1998, p. 162). 
This view can give rise to a teleological picture of history. With the advancement of technology, society 
develops in a certain way and the continued advancement will then lead society in a certain, potentially 
pre-determined, direction. While Marx is sometimes guilty of falling into this trap, we must be careful to 
avoid this temptation. We must not give productive relations more agency than they actually have and 
see them as what they are: very important in determining the shape of our social relations, but still 
mediated by humans who are extremely complicated actors whose actions cannot be predicted. We 
must therefore study each period in history independently and not try and impose the logics of one time 
period on that of another (whether going backward or forward in time). This is the trap that the 
commercialization model falls into and we must be careful not to follow suit.  
Instead of falling into the teleological trap, a better way to conceptualize the changing nature of society 
and its impacts on human nature is to use evolution as an analogy. This analogy is useful in three 
important aspects: first, It does not see that every single iteration that takes place as being positive, or 
moving in the right direction. It does postulate that the general trend, over long periods of time, is to 
move in a direction that is positive. This allows for social theory to accept discontinuities (like Germany 
leading up to WWII) but allow for the general positive trend that we have seen in society. The second 
positive aspect of the evolutionary theory is that it does not have a final goal to be reached for a species. 
While Marx can be shown to view socialism as the final stage in human development, even he 
recognizes that there will be progression and development within communism. This allows for society 
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not to be judged with respect to some abstract end, but only relatively. The third area where this 
analogy is useful is in where agency lies. In evolution the exterior conditions affect the object that is 
evolving while at the same time the object that is evolving is affecting the exterior conditions. It is not 
only the environment in which a being is placed that affects the process of evolution, but also the being 
plays a crucial role in directing the route that evolution takes. With these three points in mind, the 
theory of how living organisms evolve in response to their environment is very useful in understanding 
how human nature progresses in response to the society in which one lives. While every iteration of 
society and therefore its impact on human nature need not necessarily be in a progressive direction, the 
general thrust is in the direction of increased freedom and liberties to allow for human nature to expand 
and grow. This theory is also beneficial to avoiding a teleological outlook on history and social theory. 
The notion that there is no “final version” of society or end goal to be reached allows for the potential of 
society, and human nature, to develop in any number of different ways if the conditions to do so exist. 
Finally, in giving agency not just to society to act on individuals, but allowing room for individuals to act 
on society, the dialectical relationship between society and the way it shapes human nature and vice 
versa can exist when this analogy is used. There are, of course, many shortcomings to this analogy, but it 
serves as a useful compliment to overcome the shortcomings in Marx’s theory with regards to the 
teleological temptation while outlining some of the key aspects to the theory.  
One must be nuanced when addressing the notion of human nature, which is not something that can be 
objectively or rigidly defined. It is both a subjective topic as well as one that can have a degree of 
objectivity. Human nature is both transhistorical and historically variable. It is affected by larger social 
and productive relations and also directly affects these. Human nature is thus imbued with a certain 
degree of uncertainty. Just where the line is drawn between continuity and change, and between 
agency and determination is impossible to tell exactly; this has profound impacts on the way human 
nature is theorized. A balanced account is necessary. If one goes too far in one direction human nature 
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becomes something that is completely malleable and therefore every facet of it is affected by the 
surrounding contexts. This leaves no room for human nature to impact the shape of society and the 
relations that are built. At the other end of the spectrum, human nature becomes immune to major 
historical transformation. This is also a dangerous path because it undermines attempts to develop an 
objective understanding of the world. In this second view, social relations have no role in shaping the 
nature of our humanity. We must find a middle ground where historically variable social and economic 
forms and human nature determine each other.  
Marx’s concept of human nature is central to his overall critique of capitalism because Marxism is based 
on a moral critique. He notes that although capitalism has created an unprecedented level of wealth in 
our society, it has not allowed humans to reach our full potential. Marx notes that “In our days 
everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening 
and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of 
wealth by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want … at the same pace that mankind 
masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other man and to his own infamy” (seen in Sayers 
(1998), p 160). This critique is based on a notion of human nature that is historical, relative, and 
scientific that has human well-being as the basis for its criticism. Sayers (1998) notes that “Marxism 
judges human social and moral development in terms of its impact on the growth of human nature – of 
human powers, capacities and needs” (164). This shortcoming of capitalism is at the heart of Marx’s 
social theory and at the heart of this criticism is his theory of alienation. While the details and the 
intricacies of the theory of alienation will be explored in the next section, Dickens (1859) in his Tale of 
Two Cities starts off his book by noting this contradiction in poetic language: 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, 
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it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had 
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all 
going direct to the other way” (5).  
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3.0 Alienation 
What requires explanation is not the unity of living and active human beings with the natural, 
inorganic conditions of their metabolism, with nature, and therefore with the appropriation of 
nature; nor is this the result of a historical process. What we must explain is the separation of 
these inorganic conditions of human existence from this active existence, a separation which is 
only fully completed in the relations between wage-labour and capital (Seen in Ollman (1976, p 
133) 
Marx uses the concept of alienation to explain this rift that has been created between the current 
condition of human beings and the potential that we have. For this paper the definition of alienation 
that Ollman (1976) posits will be utilized. He defines it as “the intellectual construct in which Marx 
displays the devastating effect of capitalist production on human beings, on their physical and mental 
states and on the social processes of which they are a part” (131). In addition to the three areas where 
Ollman notes the destructive effects of capitalist production, in recent years a fourth has come to be of 
increasing significance: the environment. With climate change a reality and the causes of this crisis 
almost unanimous, there is little doubt that capitalist production has played a crucial role in 
exacerbating the climate crisis and therefore is an aspect that should be taken seriously in any 
intellectual construction that aims to reveal the destructive effects of capitalist production on human 
well-being and development.  
Alienation therefore goes much deeper than just the alienation of humans from the production process. 
It also touches on the impacts that capitalist production has had on the condition of the species itself, 
the overall wellbeing of the people who are forced to live under this economic system, the relationships 
that are built and fostered under these production relations, and the environment that we all have to 
live in. Another critical detail of the definition is that it only addresses the destruction that is caused by 
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the capitalist mode of production. This definition does not aim to suggest that these destructive forces 
did not exist in previous methods of economic or social organization. It must be stated at the outset that 
some form of these destructive forces have existed in various combinations and to varying degrees of 
severity within other forms of production and throughout history. In some cases one aspect of this 
destruction was worse than the way that it manifests itself within capitalist production. Within slavery, 
for example, the destruction that was wreaked on the human body was much worse for the majority 
population than it is under capitalism. This definition then is useful for identifying the unique 
characteristics of the environmental, social, and personal destruction that has been manifested through 
capitalist production. In order to trace some of the roots of this process, first the transition to capitalism 
will be analyzed using the framework that was laid out in the first section of this paper. This involves 
tracing back to the origins of some of the ideas and concepts that have created the current state of 
alienation. This section will focus on some of the extra economic factors that were revolutionized by the 
transition and how these exacerbate alienation. Next, the theory of alienation will be developed to 
explain and show some of the destructive effects that capitalism has had on human relations to 
production, human relations to each other, and human relations to the environment. This section will 
show how the capitalist mode of production is responsible for the stifling of the human nature, an effect 
caused by the increased wealth and productive power created within capitalism. 
It is important to note that this paper uses a very specific definition of alienation that is different from 
the broader use of the term. Williams (1985) notes that while this term can be used in many different 
ways, its primary use is to describe forms of estrangement. This estrangement can range from a feeling 
of separation from God to the breakdown of social relations between either individuals or groups of 
people. While these two themes explain an exterior relationship, the way that alienation will be used in 
this paper will be more to refer to internal relations. This paper uses the term alienation to describe the 
ways in which human beings are prevented from reaching their full potential. This is the difference 
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between the form and essence of alienation. While the broader uses of the term typically tend to 
address the external form alienation takes, this paper will dig a little deeper and attempt to understand 
the internal essence of alienation. The underlying factors that create the external manifestations of 
alienation will be explored to ensure that one is not trying to treat the symptoms but the root causes of 
alienation. This conception of alienation will therefore be much more general than the broader uses. As 
opposed to focusing on specific manifestations of alienation, this paper will use the concept of 
alienation to show how capitalist social relations have degraded human potential and have become a 
force that hinders any further growth in human nature. In principle, the notion of alienation discussed in 
this paper can be developed to explain things like racism, sexism, or colonialism where one group of 
people are not allowed to reach their full potential because of some social force. While I will not develop 
the term fully in these directions in this paper, this paper will lay the groundwork for a framework that 
can be used to understand these phenomena in a systemic and relational way. 
3.1 Extra Economic Effects of the transition to capitalism 
In order to understand some of the non-economic impacts of the transition to capitalism and in an 
attempt to avoid what Polanyi (1977) termed, “the economistic fallacy”, Ollman’s (1976) interpretation 
of Marx’s alienation will be taken with respect to some of the events and occurrences that took place 
around the transition. There are a few key points about Ollman’s study that need to be brought to light 
in order to apply his theory of alienation to the events around the transition. The first is that his theory 
is a study of people in their relations with each other, their products, their activities, and the 
environment. The people that Ollman studies are not particular individuals, but people who are socially 
constructed and whose “conditions become an extension of who he (sic) is and what he does, rather 
than the reverse” (ix). This follows well from Sayers notion of human nature and the agency that is 
played out with the factors that affect it. Ollman also views human consciousness as well as the 
thoughts and ideas that we have as being very strongly influenced by the society in which we live. He 
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notes that “man’s consciousness of himself and of his relations with others and with nature are that of a 
social being, since the manner in which he conceives of anything is a function of his society” (108). 
Ollman’s theory also places social relations as a subject matter. This gives causal power to social 
relations and assumes that these relations are not simply by-products of other factors but have a degree 
of agency embedded within them. Finally, Ollman repeatedly insists that internal relations must be 
central in any understanding of alienation. This places an emphasis on the internal content of social and 
productive relations while placing less significance on the external form that manifests. This emphasis 
typically leads to a dialectic method. Ollman (1976) describes this as follows: “The dialectical method of 
inquiry is best described as research into the manifold ways in which entities are internally related” (62).  
Using these notes about Ollman’s method, let us now dive into some of the social relations that existed 
within rural England during the transition to see how the transition affected more than just economic 
relations. 
3.1.1 The state 
One of the biggest differences that allowed for capitalism to emerge in rural England was the role that 
the state played. This unique characteristic of the state was described in the first section of the paper. In 
brief, the English state was more unified which allowed it to have a monopoly control over the use of 
force. Ollman (1976) notes that the role of the state can be seen as a reflection of the relationship 
between an individual and the society in which s/he lives. He believes that “in capitalism, the state is an 
abstraction in political life on the same plane that value is in economic life” (216)2. This comes about by 
the reification of the powers that are given to the state and the autonomous character they take. He 
goes on to note that “like value, the state expresses the alienated relations of capitalist society” (216). 
                                                          
2 Here it is important to clarify what Ollman means by an abstraction and how this relates to alienation. He 
believes that “at its simplest, ‘abstraction’ refers to the type of purity that is achieved in emptiness”. He goes on to 
note that the alienated man is an abstraction because “he has lost touch with all human specificity” and therefore 
is reduced to the lowest common denominator of what a human can be. A person is said to be an abstraction of 
themselves if they have lost all unique characteristics that differentiate her/him from others (Ollman, 1976, p. 
134).  
59 
 
Here value in capitalist society plays an abstraction to the real cost of a product. Value hides all the 
social relations that went into producing that commodity behind a number (the price). Therefore 
although all commodities are produced in different conditions using different tools and raw materials, 
all the social relations that were necessary to produce a commodity are abstracted away and only a 
price tag remains as the primary and driving factor on which a consumer bases her/his purchasing 
decision. Similarly, in the capitalist state, all citizens are seen to be equal under the eyes of the law, but 
a crucial word in this statement is that the citizens are, in fact, under the law. They are forced to abide 
by the laws of the state in which they live. The only way in which that system would be just is if the 
people were allowed to choose the laws under which they were to live. This was most certainly not the 
case in England during the transition and is still not the case in today’s society. This arrangement of 
people living under laws that they did not have any power to influence therefore creates a façade of 
equality while hiding the true power and social relations that exist to create and enforce these laws. This 
can be explained as a sort of political fetishism where the internal social relations are hidden. The origins 
of this process can be seen to come about within the transition to capitalism. With the centralization of 
the state that occurred and the loss of extra-economic forms of coercion from land owners, the ruling 
class was forced to resort to intervention by the centralized state to bring about the laws that they 
desired. Ollman notes: “another aspect of political alienation in capitalism is that the centralization of 
governmental institutions together with bourgeoning population has gone so far as to rule out all 
meaningful face to face contact between the governed and the governors” (217). These trends can be 
seen by some of the legislation that was passed when capitalism first started to spread in England. This 
paper will focus on two sets of regulations to show the role that the state played in alienating itself from 
its members: (i) a set of regulations that were designed to create a new workforce, and (ii) the repealing 
of Speenhamland.  
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This alienated state was responsible for passing a series of legislations whose intention was to create a 
new workforce from the people whose land was recently enclosed. The enclosure movement resulted in 
a large number of people who lost ownership of their land. This loss of land was not just the loss of a 
place to live, but also their means of reproducing themselves since most people in that time relied 
almost exclusively on the land for their subsistence. This legislation was not a single piece of legislation, 
but a series of laws that were passed to ensure that those who had just lost their ability to reproduce 
themselves would become members of a new type of workforce that was becoming increasingly 
significant in England during the period leading up to the transition. Marx terms these “Bloody 
Legislation Against the Expropriated”(Marx, 1977, pp. 896–905). Within this set of legislation there were 
two themes that took place. First was the fixing of wages and the struggle for the working day. Within 
this, first there was a maximum wage that was fixed. This was put in place to curb some of the demands 
that labour was making and to allow for the complementary trend to increase the length of the working 
day. These two measures allowed for power to be given primarily to employers. Employers were 
allowed to lengthen the working day to a level that was on the cusp of workers’ physical limits, and 
them being legislated to cap the maximum that they were allowed to pay their workers is something 
well beyond any conceivable moral limit. However, these are ideal conditions for the maximization of 
surplus extraction. A large increase in the length of the working day combined with a legal maximum 
wage is a recipe for social disaster and brought about the serious question of whether workers were 
able to sufficiently reproduce themselves under these circumstances. To ensure that workers could 
continue to reproduce themselves, there was a series of legislations that were passed in the early to 
mid-nineteenth century that were designed to limit the length of the working day. These were passed 
not to ensure that workers had a decent life or with their concerns in mind, but with the long term 
interest of capital in mind. In order for this bourgeoning system to continue to grow, it required a 
workforce that was capable of working while also reproducing themselves to create the next generation 
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of workers. It was found that the perfect blend of long workdays along with a maximum wage for the 
extraction of surplus value was extremely deleterious to the health and wellbeing of labour and 
therefore its ability to reproduce itself. In order to continue to have a workforce, the English Factory 
Acts were passed to limit the length of the workday (Marx, 1977).  
The second set of “Bloody Legislation” was passed to deal with people who refused to or did not want to 
work. In this set, the first piece of legislation was passed in 1530 and it mandated that only those who 
were elderly and unable to work would receive a licence that would allow them to beg and anyone 
caught begging without this licence would be tortured. In 1572 a law was passed that exacerbated the 
punishment that was wrought on people who were found begging without a licence. The penalty was 
that for the first offence they would be flogged and branded. The second time they were caught they 
would be executed unless someone takes them into service, while the third time meant that they would 
be executed regardless. In addition to this, in 1547 a statute was passed that ordained that if anyone 
were to refuse to work, they would become a slave whose master is the person who “denounced him 
idler”. As Marx poetically sums it up: “Thus were the agricultural people, first forcibly expropriated from 
the soil, driven from their homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws 
grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system” (Marx, 1977, p. 880). The worst 
human effects of these legislations were mitigated by Speenhamland which acted to guarantee people a 
minimum wage. The second regulation that proved how alienated the state was from the people was 
the repealing of Speenhamland. 
Speenhamland was the biggest impediment to the creation of a labour market. Before the introduction 
of this law, labour was bound to the parish and therefore lacked mobility. In 1795 (the same year that 
Speenhamland was adopted) legislation was passed that unbound labour from their parishes and thus 
allowed them to move. This measure was passed in order to create a labour market that was not limited 
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to the people that lived in one area, but allowed for landlords to get labour from places other than 
where they were located. There was concern (and rightly so) about the effects that this would have on 
peasants who were not protected by any other means and were not guaranteed the means to 
reproduce themselves. Speenhamland guaranteed everyone a minimum income that was based on the 
price of bread. This was seen as a major impediment to the creation of a labour market because it gave 
the peasants a way to survive without being exploited by landlords. Before the Speenhamland law came 
into existence, peasants were ruled by the Elizabethan Law where they were forced to work for 
whatever wages were offered and only those who did not work were entitled to relief. Speenhamland 
extended the relief to include even people who were working, but did not earn enough to reproduce 
themselves. This created a situation where labourers had no financial interest in satisfying their 
employers. Polanyi (1944) notes that because of this guarantee “[n]o measure was ever more 
universally popular” (83). Employers were happy because they were free to lower their wages to a 
bottomless minimum and labour was happy that they had a minimum guaranteed allowance to ensure 
their and their families reproduction. It is important to keep in mind that this was taking place before 
the capitalist logic had taken a firm root in peoples’ minds. Being a pauper who was fed came with a 
social stigma. This traditional mindset is what stopped the contradiction of having a “right to live” law 
alongside wage labour from pushing wages to zero.  
The repealing of this law meant that peoples “right to live” was no longer guaranteed by the state. 
Therefore in order for anyone (and their families) to survive, they had to sell their labour power on the 
market for a wage that was used to buy commodities. The repealing of Speenhamland was a major 
factor in the creation not only of the conditions in which a labour market could come forth, but it was 
also instrumental in moving society in a direction that would allow for the capitalist system to take root 
and entrench the ideologies that come along with it. The repealing of Speenhamland was in line with the 
new dominant ideology of the “economic man” who would do as little as possible to survive and 
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therefore would not opt to work for a wage if he could subsist while staying at home. Polanyi (2001) 
notes this well when he states that while the economic impacts of these policies are important, the 
extra-economic forces that arise are equally so: 
“If we suggest that the study of Speenhamland is the study of the birth of nineteenth-century 
civilization, it is not its economic and social effect that we have exclusively in mind, not even the 
determining influence of these effects upon modern political history, but the fact that, mostly 
unknown to the present generation, our social consciousness was cast in its mold” (87) 
3.1.2 Private property 
This mold that was created was a necessary step for the creation of the alienated state that aimed to 
give the appearance of the citizenry having power and agency while hiding the true power relations that 
existed. This mold went hand in hand with other changes that occurred in the social fabric through the 
transition. One of the major transformations that occurred was the introduction of private property and 
the social relations that followed from this. As was shown above, England was in a unique place 
politically with the erosion of extra-economic forms of coercion in the 16th century. This led to Locke’s 
concept of “improvement” taking a very prominent role in the English ethos. Improvement was not 
necessarily about better methods or technology in agriculture, but “improvement meant, even more 
fundamentally, new forms and conceptions of property” (Wood, 2002, p. 107). It signalled a shift in the 
way land was both conceptualized and utilized – now only the most productive use of land would be 
considered and implemented.  This process essentially converted land from being used to produce food 
to becoming pastures for sheep to graze on. This signalled a major shift in the priorities (values) of the 
English economy. From producing use values in the form of food, the land was seen to be more “useful” 
if it created exchange values in the form of wool from the sheep. This came in tandem with Locke’s 
theory of property. Locke’s theory conflated labour with value. While this is something that Marx also 
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believes, Locke’s theory was extremely powerful because it put forth the notion that the labour of the 
one whose labour power I have purchased is my property. This would mean that the people who have 
bought labour power on the market have legal ownership of the products that are produced by the 
labour power that was purchased. This ethic was often used as a justification for some of the laws “to 
support the landlord seeking to extinguish the customary rights of commoners, to exclude them from 
common land, and to turn common land into exclusive private property by means of enclosure” (Woods, 
2002, p.115). This newly adopted ethos was foundational in setting up the social structures and relations 
in which the alienation that currently exists could sprout, of which private property was central. 
Marx refers to private property as “the material summary expression of alienated labour” and 
elsewhere he notes that it is 
“the sensuous expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same 
time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the 
assertion of his life is the alienation of his life, that his realization is the loss of reality, is an alien 
reality” (seen in Ollman (1976, p.159)) 
Ollman goes on to note that there is a dialectical relationship that exists between private property and 
alienated labour. He states that one cannot exist without the other, each creating the conditions and 
social relations necessary for the other to exist and reproduce itself. He notes that it is the movement of 
private property that leads to alienated labour. But when one digs deeper, it is can also be said that 
private property could only come about as a result of alienated labour. This reciprocal relationship is 
more than just one that continues trends that exist; it is one that each of these elements is 
foundationally necessary for the other to exist i.e. alienated labour could not exist without private 
property and vice versa. This relationship is summed up well by Marx when he notes that 
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Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labour, 
of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. Private property thus results by 
analysis from the concept of alienated labour – i.e. of alienated man, of estranged labour, of 
estranged life, of estranged man. True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that 
we have obtained the concept of alienated labour (of alienated life) from political economy. But 
on analysis of this concept it becomes clead that through private property appears to be the 
source the cause of alienated labour, it is really its consequence, just as the gods in the 
beginning are not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion. Later this relationship 
becomes reciprocal. (Seen in Ollman, 1976, p. 163) 
These two aspects (the new role of the state and private property) were central in creating the 
conditions for capitalism to arise. While capitalism could not have taken root without them, they also 
signalled a new phenomenon that was taking place outside of the realm of economics: in the 
development of human beings. This new capitalist mode of production allowed for a great deal of 
growth in human nature, but at the same time it constrained that growth. This contradictory aspect of 
capitalism is at the root of Marx’s moral critique of the system and the theory of alienation is what he 
uses to bring this contradiction to the fore. The next section will touch on the various ways in which the 
new capitalist logic was inhibiting the growth of humans against the new potential that was created i.e. 
will dive into some of the ways that alienation actually occurs. 
3.2 Theory of Alienation 
While the definition of alienation was laid out earlier, it is important to note the relationship that exists 
between the concept of alienation and capitalism. Some of Marx’s writings on alienation will be 
introduced to show that alienation is inherent to the capitalist mode of production. Next the concept of 
value that is created within capitalism will be analyzed, and although this will be explained in greater 
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detail in upcoming sections, it will lay the foundation for a moral critique of capitalism. As can be seen 
from the previous section, Marx had a great deal to say about the nature of humanity and the way that 
it was both transhistorical and socially determined. This leads to the moral component of his critique of 
capitalist production as an impediment to human growth. He believes that humans are primarily 
productive (as opposed to consumptive) beings and therefore our production relations are very 
instructive to our development. He then notes that because of the nature of social relations under 
capitalism, the products that are created and the ways in which they are produced constrain human 
development and impede us from reaching our potential as a species. Marx considers alienation to be 
intrinsic to any form of production that revolves around the exchange of commodities that are privately 
owned (Ollman, 1976). How this manifests itself will be analyzed in upcoming sections, but currently the 
internal dynamics that allow for this will be explored. Marx’s words on this form an instructive lens from 
which to view the topics of the upcoming section. He notes that “presupposing private property, my 
work is an alienation of life, for I work in order to live, in order to obtain for myself the means of life. My 
work is not my life” (Marx, 1844).  
In order to understand the internal relations that exist in order to create the conditions for alienation, it 
is first instructive to note that there was a shift in value relations that came about within the transition 
to capitalism. A telling example of this shift in values was the way that nature was considered after the 
transition and the drive that was created to try and quantify the value that existed within nature (both 
human and non-human). Burkett (2009) notes that this drive created a tension that continues to persist. 
Within the value relations that exist within capitalism, the only entity that is recognized to have value is 
money or capital. This creates a drive to monetize nature. He notes five primary contradictions that arise 
from this:  (i) Nature cannot be disaggregated into discrete and homogenous value units; (ii) inability to 
account for the irreversible character of many natural processes; (iii) the tension between the infinite 
supply of money and finite supply of natural resources; (iv) disconnect between price and absolute size 
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of a nature stock; and (v) higher resource prices could potentially accelerate resource depletion (p 122- 
124).  These contradictions, while they speak of the environmental consequences from the shift in value 
relations created during the transition, they also give a glimpse into how the shift in value relations had 
drastic impacts on the entity that was being valued. Burkett (2009) ends his book by noting that there is 
an intrinsic connection between the exploitation of nature and that of labour (which are both 
predicated on the value relations that are created) (242). 
Therefore the value relations that are created within capitalism extend beyond nature and have created 
a new type of productive activity that is unique to capitalism: Labour. Marx notes this connection when 
he defines labour as, “in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in 
which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and 
Nature” (Marx, 1977, p. 284). While this aspect of labour has existed in all societies, one of the 
fundamental elements that make labour under capitalist production unique is the role of private 
property. First, the means of production under capitalism are no longer owned by the workers that are 
doing the actual labour. While this is true of all class societies, capitalism concretizes the role of the 
capitalist and the worker to a degree that has not existed in previous societies. To this point, there are 
two aspects that have been privatized that have not been before: Labour Power3 and the Means of 
Production. The means of production under capitalism are controlled by the capitalist class who use 
them, along with labour power that is also bought and sold on the market as private property, to create 
commodities which they then sell on the market for a higher value than the value of the labour power it 
took to produce them. This gain that the capitalist derives is labelled as surplus value and the aim of the 
capitalist class is to extract as much surplus value as possible from both the labour power and the means 
of production that are now the private property of the capitalist. The ownership of the means of 
                                                          
3 Labour power describes the capacity to do work. Marx is careful to distinguish between the capacity to do work 
and the actual work being done (labour). This distinction is crucial because it is the capacity of the worker to do 
work that the capitalist is buying on the market as opposed to the labourer herself (Marx, 1977) 
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production in hands other than those who are doing the work makes for work that is disconnected from 
the producers and removes the potential for production to be a creator of meaning and fulfilment in 
one’s life. The second important outcome with respect to the alienation that results from private 
property is that the product that is created belongs to someone apart from the actual producers. This 
creates a situation where the products that are created are no longer connected to the producers, but 
are simply created in order to earn an income so that the producer can return to the market to buy the 
goods necessary for their reproduction. The way this manifests itself will be analyzed further in the 
following section. 
Alienation, although more rigidly defined earlier, can be simplified to a term that describes the 
disjuncture between the state of people as they currently exist and their potential. Hegel’s notion of 
truth can be used to clarify. While the human nature that currently exists is the actual manifestation of 
the social and production relations that exist within capitalism, it falls short of the true human nature 
that can exist given our current levels of wealth and technology. This leaves capitalism as both a positive 
and negative force in the molding of human nature. In the positive sense, it created conditions that 
allow for human nature to grow and develop in ways that were impossible before the transition to 
capitalism. It has however simultaneously pushed the limits of what it is capable of fostering and 
nurturing within this economic system. Human nature has grown to a level where capitalism is no longer 
capable of meeting human aspirations. Capitalism is also unable to foster any further development 
without major reform that would necessitate a break with some of the foundational tenets of capitalist 
production that were laid out earlier. This section will lay bare some of the ways in which capitalism is 
currently inhibiting human nature and not allowing it to grow to its true potential given the nature of 
society today. It will begin by noting how capitalist production has alienated humans from production 
(both in the activity itself and the product that is created). Here the concept of alienated labour will be 
explored and the product that comes from this type of labour will also be analyzed to show how humans 
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under capitalism are producing under compulsions that inhibit their ability to develop their human 
nature. Next the alienation that exists in our social relations will be analyzed. For this section, the social 
relations that exist under the ethos of capital will be explored and this will expose how destructive 
capitalism is on social relations. In this section, first human alienation from other humans will be studied 
and then the alienation of humans from the species in general will be touched on. Finally, the last 
section will briefly introduce some of the ways that capitalist production has been detrimental to human 
relations to nature. Here some of the value relations that exist within capitalism will be explored to 
expose the ways in which this has created a framework where nature is seen as something external to 
us that we must conquer in order to thrive. 
3.2.1 Human alienation from production 
As noted in the section on human nature, production and the processes associated with it are central 
tenets of who we are as a species. Capitalism, in its essence, alienated humans from their production 
relations. The labour that is done within the capitalist mode of production is referred to by Marx as 
alienated labour. Ollman (1976) describes this process succinctly when he notes that “instead of 
developing the potential inherent in man’s powers, capitalist labour consumes these powers without 
replenishing them, burns them up as if they were a fuel, and leaves the individual worker that much 
poorer” (138). This type of labour is extremely detrimental to both the mental and physical well-being of 
humans. Physically it exhausts humans and leaves them in a decrepit state of being. Marx outlines some 
of the negative physical effects of capitalist labour in Capital (Marx, 1977, pp. 340–417, 636–642). While 
many of the most egregious of these violations are no longer prevalent in advanced capitalist societies, 
capitalist labour still tends to be detrimental to the wellbeing of human physical health. In addition to 
this, many of the devastating impacts of capitalist labour on human bodies is simply shifted to the 
Global South and therefore have not been addressed, but simply relocated. In addition to the physical 
effects, capitalist production also wreaks havoc on the mental health of those who are forced to work 
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under the logic of capital. This can be seen by the increasing instances of mental health issues in 
advanced societies. Here Ollman (1976) notes that “the worker’s subjective feelings of ‘being at home 
when he is not working’ and ‘not at home’ when he is working” is an important aspect of the creation of 
the void that exists for workers who are forced to sell their labour on the market in order to survive 
(140). This touches on the relationship between private property and alienated labour that was 
mentioned earlier. It is important to note that a concept like alienated labour is a comparative concept. 
It is only useful in comparing alienated labour to labour that is not alienated. This labour exists within 
communism according to Marx. Ollman (1976) sums up alienated labour noting that “the relations of 
capitalist productive activity to man’s species self, to his body and mind, to his subjective feelings when 
doing labour, to his will to engage in capitalist labour, to the capitalist, to his own human and animal 
functions and to what productive activity will be like under communism equal alienated labour” (141).  
The next aspect of alienation with production is the alienation that exists between labour and the goods 
that are produced. Ollman (1976) notes three particular characteristics about the product that alienate 
the producer from it: i. the product is created from alienated labour, ii. The product is not necessary for 
the reproduction of the worker, and iii. the worker is subservient to what is lost in the process of 
production (143). In the first instance, the centrality of production within human nature leads to 
humans essentially putting themselves into the objects that we create. When these objects are created 
under the condition of alienated labour, the product that is created is, inherently, alienated from the 
humans that produced it. The next way in which the product that is created is alienated from the worker 
is that the product typically is not necessary for the reproduction of the worker. The work that is done in 
capitalism is not an end in itself and therefore the production process is not done with the intended 
outcome of sustaining the worker’s livelihood directly, but is instead done to earn an income that is then 
used to reproduce the worker. This extra step makes work not an end in itself, but only a means to an 
end. This separation creates a workforce that has no inherent interest in the goods that are produced 
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and therefore creates products that are alienated from the producer. Finally, the goods that are 
produced under capitalist production are alienated from the worker because of the way that goods are 
enriched through production at the expense of labour. The value system created within capitalism 
(which will be addressed in further detail in the section on nature) creates a production process in which 
the goal is solely the transfer (and creation) of value. In this process the creation of surplus value is the 
only aim and therefore this comes at the cost of the workers who are producing the commodities that 
are to be sold on the market. This process creates a workforce that, instead of having a positive 
relationship with the goods that are produced, has a negative one. This robbing of value from workers 
creates goods that are alienated from the workers that produce them.  
3.2.2 Human alienation from fellow humans 
Another fundamental aspect of human nature is that it is inherently social. Humans do not exist as 
individual entities that are isolated from each other, but instead as beings that depend on others not 
only to survive, but also to thrive. The first way that capitalism alienates humans from each other is in 
the class structure that is fundamental to capitalist production. Capitalism cannot exist without the 
creation of two classes that have antagonistic social relations. The one class is the capitalist class that 
owns the means of production and therefore has significant power and control over society. The second 
class is the working class that is, according to Marx, “free in the double sense, that as a free man he can 
dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other 
commodity for sale (Marx, 1977, p. 274). In production, these two classes have antagonistic objectives: 
the capitalist class aims to maximize surplus value while the working class aims to try to increase wages. 
This antagonistic relationship creates a gulf between the capitalist and the workers that pit one against 
the other. In addition to this class struggle that exists, capitalist production also acts to pit the working 
class against itself. The way that labour is bought and sold on the market like a commodity, in 
conjunction with the existence of unemployment and underemployment (creating a “reserve army of 
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labour” (Marx, 1977, pp. 762–854)), puts a downward pressure on the price of labour. This downward 
pressure serves the capitalist class by pitting workers against each other in their search for employment. 
The existence of the reserve army of labour gives the capitalist class power to constantly lower wages 
because there are people who are desperate for a job who are willing to sell their labour power for less 
than it costs to reproduce it. This gives truth to the words of Joan Robinson (1962) when she so 
poignantly notes that “The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of 
not being exploited at all” (45). This pitting of workers against each other creates a tension between 
workers and causes a rift between people who otherwise have a common interest. The bringing in of 
strikebreaking workers is an example of this antagonism that is extremely detrimental to the 
relationship that people in a similar social sphere would otherwise have with one another. 
The second way in which capitalist production alienates humans from each other is in the way that it 
alienates us from our potential as a species. Ollman (1976) notes that when “Marx claims that 
‘estranged human labour estranges the species from man’, he is saying that the unique configuration of 
relations which distinguishes the individual as a human being has been transformed into something 
quite different by the performance of capitalist labour” (151). He goes on to note that this form of 
alienation is considered from the viewpoint of the individual. He quotes Marx, who views this alienation 
from the perspective of an individual who is a member of the species. Marx says that “In tearing away 
from man the object of his production … estranged labour tears from him his species life, his real species 
objectivity, and transforms his advantage over animals into a disadvantage that his organic body, nature, 
is taken from him” (seen in Ollman, 1976, p. 151). The case in point is that the advantage that humans 
have over other animals is the human capacity to create things that are beyond the realm of basic 
survival, to create things for the sole purpose of beauty or pleasure. This advantage that humans have 
over other animals is turned on itself and becomes a disadvantage when “natural objects to which he is 
related become the property of other men” (Ollman, 1976, p. 152). Because of the existence of private 
73 
 
property, humans are restricted in what can be used to satisfy our needs and this limitation prevents us 
from being able to use the objects we desire, or require, to satisfy our wants and needs. Another 
uniquely human advantage that is turned into a disadvantage is our consciousness. Our consciousness 
allows us to be aware of what we are doing and also to plan our activities. Our consciousness allows for 
a task to be done for reasons beyond either immediate gratification or survival as is the case with the 
vast majority of tasks done by other animals. This allows for tasks to have a purpose that goes beyond 
base drives and desires, therefore giving a sense of purpose to the actions themselves and not just the 
end results. With alienated labour, this sense of satisfaction is taken away from us. When labour 
becomes only a means to an end and not an end in itself, that deeper sense of satisfaction that can be 
gained from producing is taken away. Thus this type of production constrains us from reaching our 
potential as human beings and limits the amount of growth and satisfaction that can be gained from 
productive activity. 
3.2.3 Human alienation from nature 
Human alienation from other humans is very closely connected to the alienation that occurs to non-
human nature. Ollman (1976) notes that “every self-estrangement of man from himself and from nature 
appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men other than and differentiated from 
himself” (148). When addressing the alienation of humans from nature it is important to define what 
“nature” or “the environment” actually is. Here Vogel (1988) does a comprehensive job of outlining the 
sociality of the environment when he notes that  
the "environment" from which we are alienated is a social environment, and that our alienation 
derives from our failure to recognize its sociality. To say that our environment is social is not 
merely to say that social forces and institutions - the market, the political system, gender roles, 
etc - are as "real" to us as the physical objects that surround us; it is to point out that even those 
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physical objects themselves are always already the result of social labour. Just as we are 
alienated from the social institutions around us when they come to appear not as the product of 
human action but rather like forces of nature - i.e., independently given and unalterable facts 
entirely outside of our control - so too we are alienated from the objects around us when they 
appear to us not as the result of social labour but rather as mere "commodities" entering into 
mysterious relations with each other on the basis of a seemingly natural price (375-376). 
This view is contrasted to a perspective that sees the environment as external to us, one that views the 
“environment” and “humans” as mutually exclusive. This view posits and dictates that the rift created 
between humans and the environment can be bridged by admitting to the externality of nature, 
submitting to its power over us, and agreeing to live under this external “natures”. This view of the 
environment, Vogel notes, is mistaken in several ways. First, it sees the actions of humans as 
“unnatural”. This view sees the human interventions that take place on the environment as 
encroachments on nature and therefore creates a dichotomy between the “natural” actions of non-
human nature and the actions of human beings. The second area in this school of thought that is 
mistaken is in its notion of “pure” nature. This school of thought believes that only nature that is not 
impacted by human activity is natural. This creates a notion of true “wilderness” that consists of a piece 
of nature that has been “withdrawn from the natural order in which human transformative activity plays 
a crucial part” (377). He sums up his critique by noting that “ultimately the word "environment" is not 
ambiguous: we live in a single environment, not two, and it is a natural one - and so is increasingly 
becoming a human one as well” (376-377). The view that Vogel recommends instead recognizes our 
connectedness to the environment and therefore recognizes its sociality. This view puts forth a 
dialectical relationship between nature and humans: humans are active participants in nature while at 
the same time nature is an active participant and very influential in shaping us as a species. He ends his 
piece by noting that the two central terms to his conception of alienation are “humanization” and 
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“recognition”. He goes on to state the “alienation occurs not when we humanize nature but when we 
fail to recognize that that is what we are doing: when our act becomes an alien power over and against 
us” (381).  
This form of alienation is extremely detrimental to human growth and progress. In the shorter term, this 
rift doesn’t allow for some of the individual and societal gains that can be garnered from a respect of 
nature.  In the longer term, there is a possible link that could be drawn between environmental crises 
and the current condition of the relationship between humans and nature. Moore (2000) notes some of 
the way this connection plays out and traces the roots of the crisis to the origins of capitalism. He notes 
that “by locating the origins of modern ecological degradation in the 16th century, I suggest that the 
ecological contradictions of the present are not essentially rooted in industrialization or corporate 
depredation but are found rather in the logic of capital itself” (146). This touches on some of the topics 
covered earlier in the paper, in its attempt to trace the roots of these alienations not to the particular 
manifestation that is currently occurring, but rather to the logic and internal relations that result from 
the logic of capital. 
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4.0 Conclusion 
Capitalism as a mode of production is inherently alienating. As was shown, from its roots, the 
fundamental building blocks upon which the capitalist mode of production rests limit the potential of 
human nature. This paper showed that from its inception, the foundations upon which capitalism is 
built, i.e. private property and the capitalist state are inherently alienating. This paper then went on to 
show that human nature is dynamic and is strongly influenced by the society in which one lives. 
Capitalism influences the character of the human species. As was shown earlier, capitalist production 
has produced an unprecedented level of wealth and technology in society that has increased the 
capacities of human development greatly. Unfortunately, there are also aspects within capitalism and its 
foundational tenets that do not allow for this potential to be actually realized. This gap between the 
current state of human nature and its potential is the alienation that capitalism cannot alleviate. This 
paper also showed various ways in which the capitalist mode of production inhibits the relationship we 
have with ourselves, our fellow humans, our work, and the environment. All these aspects bring to light 
some of the contradictions that exist within the capitalist mode of production. They introduce the 
reader to the ways in which capitalism actually inhibits the potential that currently exists and tries to 
show that this potential cannot be alleviated under the framework of a capitalist mode of production. 
For further research, the connection that this alienation has with climate change could bring this 
theoretical framework to practical use. This can be studied to see whether the climate crisis that 
currently exists can be bridged by reforming capitalism in some way, or whether the system needs to be 
abolished and replaced with a more just economic order to solve the problem. This framework can also 
be used in attempts to trace the roots of other social, political, economic, and environmental injustices. 
With the laying out of the capitalist mode of production as something qualitatively distinct from other 
modes of organizing society, the roots of injustices as they currently exist can be traced to the logic that 
is inherent in capital.   
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